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NIETZSCHEAN PEDAGOGY: A REVALUATION 
FOR CONTEMPORARY EDUCATION
Abstract
This inquiry is intended to present a compilation of the work nineteenth 
century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche offered in the field of philosophy 
of education. It focuses on three elements which attempt to offer some solutions 
to the problems facing our contemporary educational institutions, particularly 
public schools:
1. the similarities between our contemporary educational climate and 
the educational climate in Nietzsche's Germany during the second 
half of the nineteenth century;
2. the viability of an education which stresses personal achievement 
through academic rigor (i.e., teaching the ubermensch, the over-man, 
or the higher state of the human condition); and,
3. the necessity of establishing a philosophy of education which places 
the learner as the focus of the entire process in order to promote 
creativity and critical thinking.
An application of the elements of Nietzschean pedagogy to contemporary 
education will produce a knowledge delivery system which answers the needs of 
the student first, the society second.
The thrust of this dissertation is the justification of a revaluation of those 
mete-educational principles which have resulted in the mediocre conditions we 
find in our schools and institutions today.
Nietzsche's concern with education during his time resulted in his model 
of education which placed the receiver of education, the student, at the focal 
point. This model is specifically not student-centered, but rather, is a blueprint for 
the development of the ubermensch, or the higher state of being of the student
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within the hum an condition, who will effect a revaluation of values. Nietzsche 
posited a philosophy of education designed to promote individual creativity and 
critical thinking based upon four elements: love between the pedagogist and the 
learner, promotion of competition in the Greek tradition of agon, adherence to a 
doctrine of amor fati, and education of the whole person.
Essentially, this dissertation establishes the circumstances of our present- 
day educational institutions, makes a thorough examination of Nietzsche's 
concept of education, and then applies these concepts in presenting a framework 
for the revaluation of our educational system through a Nietzschean pedagogy in 
the form of seven Corollaries for a Revaluation of Contemporary Education.
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NIETZSCHEAN PEDAGOGY: A REVALUATION 
FOR CONTEMPORARY EDUCATION
I teach you the superman. Man is something to be surpassed.
-Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Prologue
Part the First: An Introduction
1.00 The Inquiry
Regardless of the fact that education in the United States is one of the most 
vulnerable of its institutions, the reality that there are problems of alarming 
proportions is undeniable today. We constantly hear of the deteriorating facilities, 
the violence, the poor nationalized test scores, the poor preparation of the 
teachers, the demoralizing atmosphere under which students are supposed to 
learn, and the cries of the politicians, as well as those of concerned taxpayers, 
over causes and solutions to the tragedy of contemporary education. So it is that 
with advancements in technology, the ever-increasing influence and imposition 
of state control, and the sense of helplessness by parents, students, and teachers 
alike, contemporary education would appear to be facing crises not only in 
terms of actual delivery of a viable product but also in terms of pedagogy as
1
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pedagogy, and in terms of values.
Nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche faced a similar 
set of circumstances and issues surrounding education in his native Fatherland. 
His response was to offer a model of education which placed the receiver of 
education, the student, at the focal point of education. This model is specifically 
not student-centered, but rather, is a blueprint for the development of the 
ubermensch, or the higher state of being of the student within the human condition. 
Although his writing style was often aphoristic, poetic, and even mystical, at 
times, Nietzsche posited a philosophy of education designed to promote 
individual creativity and critical thinking. A concerted application of Nietzsche's 
treatises and pronouncements on education and teaching, as well as on 
knowledge and epistemology, presents an approach which re-affirms the 
individuality of the learner, thus promoting creativity and critical thinking.
Nietzschean Pedagogy: A Revaluation for Contemporary Education examines 
Nietzsche's philosophy of education and offers the proposition that this 
philosophy is not only applicable to contemporary education, but also, that this 
philosophy presents an approach which may be pivotal in solving many of the 
problems plaguing our educational institutions today. The intent of this 
dissertation is to bring into one volume the various interpretations of Nietzsche's 
philosophy of education, and then to evolve a mete-educational pedagogy based 
upon these observations and interpretations. Such a pedagogy is presented in 
Part the Fourth, Section 2.00, "Pedagogy of the Ubermensch." This pedagogical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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philosophy is based upon four elements: love between the pedagogist and the 
learner; using and understanding the contest, or competition, as agon, in 
pedagogical endeavors; embracing the Nietzschean concept of amor fati as a 
liberating principle in learning; and the development of the whole being in 
pedagogical ventures.
2.00 Toward a Solution
Few would argue against the proposition that education in the United
States today is suffering from a lack of consistent, concerted direction. This is
often compounded by state regulations which add to the confusion of purpose we
see in our schools today. Such confusion manifests itself in all aspects of our
schools, from the Board Room to the class room, from the negotiating by teachers'
unions to the mismanagement of administrators, from the maintenance of
curriculum to the deterioration of facilities. In the November 1993 issue of
Harper's Magazine, Benjamin Barber published an indicting article, entitled
"America Skips School: Why We Talk So Much About Education and Do So
Little". In his opening remarks he observed the following factual events as
schools were to open for Fall.
On September 8, the day most of the nation's children were scheduled to 
return to school, the Department of Education Statistics issued a report, 
commissioned by Congress, on adult literacy and numeracy in the United 
States. The results? More that 90 million adult Americans lacked simple 
literacy. Fewer than 20 percent of those surveyed could compare two 
metaphors in a poem; not 4 percent could calculate the cost of carpeting 
at a given price from a room of a given size, using a calculator. As the 
DOE report was being issued, as if to echo its findings, two of the nation's
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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largest school systems had delayed their openings: in New York, to 
remove asbestos from aging buildings; in Chicago, because of a battle over 
the budget.1
The issue of literacy is a direct reflection of the job we are doing in the classroom,
not only as students and educators, but also as a society which has long boasted
of its superiority in the halls of learning. It is this value which our society claims
to associate with education which is at the core of our problems: we profess one
thing, then perform in a different fashion.
Technology in its many shapes and forms has proven to be both a boon
and a bane: while it opens many new possibilities in all sorts of inquiries, it can
actually limit the scope and purpose of an education. There are many who
believe that part of the problem with our educational institutions today is the fact
that they are not specific enough to encompass what needs to be done on-the-job,
that is to say, we need more training for a more technically oriented work force.
Peter Shaw has offered an observation which flatly refutes this position. In "The
Competitiveness Illusion: Does our Country Need to be Literate In Order to be
Competitive? If Not, Why Read?", which appeared in the January 18, 1993, issue
of National Review, Shaw sees the technology influx as a hindrance, rather than an
enhancement, since its specificity actually requires less education and more
patterned or conditioned behavior on the parts of the students. As a
consequence, abilities to read, to write, and to think have diminished, and this is
reflected in declining test scores since before World War H
The technological society does not particularly depend on education. A 
glance at the record shows us that the rapid growth of the United States
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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into the world's greatest industrial power coincided with a steady drop in 
reading levels running from 1930 to the present. Rogna Lee Wood, a 
teacher, pointed out in an article in NR[National Review] (Sept. 14) that this 
falling off was followed by a related, long decline in SAT scores beginning 
in 1941. Technological society turns out to work in the opposite way from 
that usually supposed: namely by actually requiring less rather than more 
education of its workers. This is because modern industry depends on 
reducing human error, which means reducing dependence on the 
individual worker's expertise and judgment.2
We have assumed all along that it was technological training which actually
enhanced the process of education, when in reality, all it was doing was tailoring
the process to its own specific needs, thus creating and maintaining a kind of
status quo. The result has been both unavoidable and obvious: we have trained
workers in much the same fashion that the CIA trained operatives in the prime
of the Cold War using the "mushroom" approach, that is keeping them "in the
dark and feeding them nothing but manure". Their worldviews,
Weltanschauungen, are myopic at best and their abilities to think critically, discern
sensibly, and to analyze accurately have become severely hampered, if not
altogether atrophied.
When we begin to add such factors as competency based testing, state
m andates for specific performances, standardized teacher examinations, and major
funding from both state and federal sources, we begin to see a pattern of
governmental largesse exercising its unwieldy and arbitrary caprice over the most
im portant institution our society has developed-our educational institution. It
is not so much that the state seeks specific control, but rather, that it seeks a kind
of standardization of education performance. Nevertheless, as the aphorism goes,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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"The road to destruction is paved with the best of intentions." In like fashion, our 
schools have become subject to legislative mandates which have put serious 
shackles on the abilities of our students to think critically and to be more creative. 
In the standardization quest, all too often, the individuality of the student 
becomes secondary, and the integrity of the individual mind, to borrow from 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, becomes an obstacle to standardization. Thus, such 
measures taken by the state do little more than produce mediocrity and preserve 
the status quo. It is not so much that these outcomes are a design of state control, 
but rather, given the context of our social attitudes, and our attitudes toward 
education, there could be no other by-product today.
Friedrich Nietzsche's Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century 
exhibited eerily familiar social, economic, technological, and educational attitudes 
which we find extant in our country. The result for Germany was a kind of 
nihilism which infected every aspect of German culture. Nietzsche's works 
represent a rejection of this nihilism. The state had gained control over education, 
and technology had categorized training within empirical disciplines, holding 
liberal education a captive on the lowest level of the learning hierarchy. 
Spirituality had become obliterated by materialism, and culture was far less 
important than the accumulation of wealth. With it all, creativity and critical 
thinking were relegated to secondary positions at best. Nietzsche was fully aware 
that state control of education would result in a rigid maintenance of the status 
quo. His response was a philosophy based upon the revaluation of all values and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the creation of a class of well-educated people, in the classical tradition, who
could lead as ubermenschen, or literally translated, over-men.
Ann Margaret Sharp in "Education and Culture: A Nietzschean
Perspective," offers a summation of the cultural-educational climate which
Nietzsche faced. It foretells conditions we are experiencing in America today in
such a disquieting manner that one could easily substitute "The United States" for
"Germany" wherever it appears.
Rather than a society that had the inherent power to change, reform and 
grow, the German society was laying emphasis on stability, with the 
resulting oppression that occurs whenever change is not tolerated. Slowly 
the German state had been gaining control over the educational processes 
with the result that training was taking the place of a liberal education and 
the resulting specialization presented no alternatives to the mores of the 
day. The German child was learning that the main aim of education was 
to make money in as short a time as possible, and that this money would 
lead to happiness. Education was a necessary evil and thus should be just 
long enough to train the student to take his place in society. Anything that 
advocated change or reform was threatening to happiness and well-being.
Friedrich Nietzsche was aware of the dangers of the state control 
over education as well as the dangers of the technical society in general. 
Dehumanization, loss of freedom and creative power, as well as the loss 
of the power of self renewal could spell the death of individual power as 
well as the eventual decay of a society. Man could well become nothing 
more than a cog in a machine of production and consumption. The human 
self whose center is the will to become more, or the will to power, will 
eventually have nothing to will anymore, and therefore, it will nothing. 
Nihilism will spread all over the West. Only an education which 
encourages a new conception of individual willing and freedom as the self 
affirmation of life against anything which attempts to turn it into an object, 
can rescue man from nihilism and total disintegration. He was aware that 
education as it existed in his day, had only one aim: "to turn men into 
machines." [The Use and Abuse of History, 64.] In order for personal 
freedom to be protected much more is needed than a reform of educational 
methodology or curriculum content. Educators m ust be trained who have 
the capacity to liberate students to the point that they can generate 
alternative values for themselves and recognize the dangers to life of the 
present society. These educators must have the knowledge and the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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strength to bring students to the point where they recognize their own 
inadequacy, their own want of knowledge and then, via a slow process of 
educating, introduce the student to the dynamics of liberation. Without 
this educating, m odem man could well become a slave of the technical 
society which he himself has created.3
With this as a backdrop to what Nietzsche saw in his culture, it is not difficult to
realize his response to it. This response was the envisioning of an educational
system which obviously celebrated critical thinking and creativity. At the same
time, it would be creating a kind of elite class of educated individuals; however,
this elitism was to have been based not on privilege, but rather, on service.
The ironic nature of our culture and of Nietzsche's brings an interesting
inquiry, which is the subject matter of this dissertation. I believe it is entirely
possible, indeed, perhaps even urgent, to re-examine Nietzsche's philosophy of
education in an attempt to revaluate our contemporary educational system. The
parallels between the two cultures is almost deja vu in essence and invites an
inquiry of this nature.
The kind of schooling Nietzsche calls us to promulgate is best summed up
in Section 912 of his work The Will to Power. In this passage we can see the
dimensions of education which will allow the individual to grow and to survive
in an environment which seems filled with challenge and trepidation. In the final
analysis, it is the struggle of learning and of adapting strategies to respond to
challenge which form the student's will and character.
The most desirable thing is still under all circumstances a hard 
discipline at the proper time, i.e., at that age at which it still makes one 
proud to see that much is demanded of one. For this is what distinguishes 
the hard school as a good school from all others: that much is demanded;
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and sternly demanded; that the good, even the exceptional, is demanded 
as the norm; that praise is rare, that indulgence is nonexistent; that blame 
is apportioned sharply, objectively, without regard for talent or 
antecedents.
One needs such a school from every point of view: that applies to 
the most physical as well as to the most spiritual matters; it would be fatal 
to desire to draw a distinction here! The same discipline makes both the 
good soldier and the good scholar; and looked at more closely, there is no 
good scholar who does not have the instincts of a good soldier in his 
makeup. To be able to command and also proudly to obey; to stand in the 
ranks, but also capable at any time of leading; to prefer danger to comfort; 
not to weigh the permitted and the forbidden on a shopkeeper's scales; to 
be a foe more of the petty, sly, parasitic, than of the evil. -- W hat does one 
learn from a hard school? Obeying and commanding.4
Such an outline for a type of schooling may seem harsh, but, as clarified in this
dissertation, the harshness to be developed in actuality prepares one for a more
ascetic life of service to the culture. Education for Nietzsche is a grueling
preparation for this life of service. Ultimately, it allows the individual to emerge
as one of the ubermenschen who is capable not only of creativity and critical
thinking, but also of personal accountability and irrefutable integrity.
This brief examination of the similarities between Nietzsche's times and
ours is intended to serve as a kind of springboard in looking into the possibility
of examining the legitimacy of some of Nietzsche's concepts of education as they
seem to appropriately offer alternatives in assessing some of our problems with
contemporary education. I, for one, believe that the cultural, sodal, economic,
and intellectual climate is ripe for such an examination of the approach to
pedagogy which Nietzsche suggests. He attacks all the sacred cows of the
educational institution, not only of his era but of our era as well. Still, at the
heart of the issue is the pleading question: What should an education be doing for its
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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society, its culture, its individual constituents?
My fascination with Nietzschean approaches to most philosophical issues 
is absorbing, but this has not skewed my objectivity; rather, it has heightened it 
to a level of greater appreciation of what Nietzsche means. Through the inquiry 
of this dissertation, I have come to understand more about a process of wholeness, 
not only for the culture but also, and most importantly, for the sanctity of the 
individual.
3.00 Purpose and Significance of the Inquiry 
The purpose of any inquiry of this nature initially can be an esoteric 
venture for the searcher, but to keep it at that level is extremely myopic and 
ultimately makes no significant contribution to the general field of study to which 
it belongs. I m ust admit that this question of Nietzsche's pedagogy being a viable 
approach to contemporary education has been festering in the recesses of my soul 
for well over twenty years. Yet, as I began to see the changes taking place in our 
schools starting approximately two-and-a-half decades ago, I began to realize that 
somehow we had begun to drift from an education which gives students a broad 
base of knowledge and an inclination to develop critical thinking to an education 
which is rigidly specific in terms of its curriculum and is patterned to track 
students into predetermined career paths. My experiences as a high school 
English teacher for seven years convinced me that there must be a more suitable 
approach to students who no longer read, write, or think with the degree of
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enthusiasm, efficiency, or effectiveness exhibited by their predecessors.
Add to this the tremendous surge for stronger state/federal control of 
education, and we have a situation which is identical to that which Nietzsche 
observed in his native Germany during the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Such control actually reduces educational processes to the whims of those who 
are in power. Students are swiftly apportioned to specific career tracks for the 
purpose of preserving the status quo. They become cogs in the wheel of state 
progress, thus sacrificing their individuality, their free exercise of expression, and 
their creativity. These circumstances give me cause for great concern, as they do 
with many of my fellow citizens.
As such, I have undertaken this inquiry with the intention of offering an 
update, if you will, of the work Nietzsche did in the field of philosophy of 
education. This dissertation focuses on three elements which attempt to offer 
some solutions to the problems facing our contemporary educational institutions, 
particularly public schools.
1. Similarities between our contemporary educational climate and the 
educational climate in Nietzsche's Germany during the second half 
of the Nineteenth Century;
2. The viability of an education which stresses personal achievement 
through academic rigor, i.e., teaching the ubermensch, the over-man;
3. The necessity of establishing a philosophy of education which places 
the learner as the focus of the entire process in order to promote 
creativity and critical thinking.
It is my firm conviction that by examining the elements of Nietzschean pedagogy
in light of contemporary education we may discover a legitimate and viable
knowledge delivery system which answers the needs of the student first, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
12
society second. At the same time, our technology need not be a hindrance, 
contrary to the view Nietzsche took when he encountered the technology of his 
era. Our technology may actually be a more appropriate vehicle for producing 
the kind of student which Nietzsche sought. With it all, nevertheless, it is my 
hope that this inquiry will open the field of the philosophy of education to the 
concept of educating with the purpose of developing a more complete person- 
one who is a critical thinker, who understands the meaning of culture, who 
appreciates the arts, who has control over his own spiritual being, and who can 
function in a world which seems to have lost its way on the "yellow brick road" 
to that siren of democracy, freedom.
There has been much written and said about Nietzschean philosophy 
during the second half of the twentieth century, and we are the beneficiaries of 
such Nietzschean scholars as C. K. Ogden, Walter Kaufmann, Arthur Danto, 
Richard Schacht, and Ann Margaret Sharp, to mention a few. Where possible, I 
have been in contact with these scholars. Additionally, the members of the North 
American Nietzsche Society have been most helpful in suggesting approaches and 
in reviewing some of my work. Many articles, too, have been published in the 
past ten years dealing with Nietzsche's philosophy of education. These have been 
extremely helpful in formulating my dissertation focus.
In the final analysis, however, I am proceeding with this quest in the hopes 
of examining a legitimate pedagogical alternative to draw our educators back to 
some of the elements with which our young country has long been associated,
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namely, the development of a free-thinking, independent, critically analytic, 
creative, self-sufficient student of life who can make a viable contribution to his 
world. As grandiose as that may sound or appear, it is what the founders of this 
country had in mind when they endorsed mandatory education for all. In recent 
years we have seen a shift from this kind of education to a process which seems 
to merely placate the emotional states of the students, to entertain them into 
thinking, to by-pass the rigor of competition, and to mollify this process in terms 
of not damaging the fragile psyche of the student. In the process, we have nearly 
lost two-and-a-half generations of creativity and critical thinking. In Nietzsche's 
terms, it is necessary, nay, it is urgent that we concentrate on teaching the 
ubermensch, thus, taking the human condition to its next higher level.
4.00 Background of the Inquiry 
Much of the background to this inquiry has already been interwoven into 
the previous sections, and it is not intended to be reiterated here; rather, this 
section will attempt to provide a bit more analysis to the inquiry.
Section 2.00 offered a kind of background in establishing the conditions we 
find in our school systems today. There the usual litany of problems and 
difficulties were cited. These were compared to similar difficulties which 
Nietzsche observed in the educational systems of his day. However, in light of 
our times, we look upon a lack of thorough education as the production-line of 
illiteracy. Nietzsche looked upon it as merely a production-line for more
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members of "the herd", that mass of mediocrity which had become the result of 
education and society in nineteenth century Germany. Combining these two 
concepts, we find a drastic set of circumstances which yield a "herd of illiterates." 
Clearly, this is not what our educational institutions had set out to accomplish. 
Still, through a process which sought to enlighten the populace by offering the 
concept of equality, something was sacrificed. The sacrificial carcass was really 
a set of tw ins-individual creativity and critical thinking. It was thus with 
Nietzsche, and it is so with us.
This illiteracy has been analyzed again in Benjamin Barber's article (see
Section 2.00). Barber sees national illiteracy as a product of our duplicitous
approaches to education. Our students are told one thing, then see the
establishment (i.e., parents and teachers) do something quite contrary or even
contradictory to that which they have been told.
The illiteracy of the young turns out to be our own reflected back 
to us with embarrassing force. We honor ambition, we reward 
greed, we celebrate materialism, we worship acquisitiveness, we 
cherish success, and we commercialize the classroom—and then we 
bark at the young about the gentle arts of the spirit. We 
recommend history to the kids but rarely consult it ourselves. We 
make a fuss about ethics but are satisfied to see it taught as an 
"add-on", as in "ethics in medicine" or "ethics in business"-as if 
Sunday morning in church could compensate for uninterrupted 
sinning from Monday to Saturday.5
Barber here is striking at the core of our personal and societal commitment to
education. He has observed that we have created a "do-as-I-say-not-as-I-do"
atmosphere in which students cannot understand what is expected of them. As
a consequence, they rebel, briefly, before they roll over and become absorbed into
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the burgeoning system. What they bring with them when they are assimilated
into the system is a carload of resentful attitudes which manifest themselves in
a kind of nihilism—not unlike that encountered by Nietzsche in his time. It is
exhibited in such cultural vehicles as music, dress, and in such anti-sodal
behaviors as vandalism and other forms of violence, but it is still a progeny of
nihilism, that sense of uselessness, of negativism, of nothingness.
It is time, therefore, that we take a more serious consideration of what
Nietzsche had to say about education. He looks first to the educator, who must
not only be able to communicate verbally, but also the educator must
communicate by example as well. While the student's existential circumstances
m ust not be overlooked, and, in fact, should be explicitly examined by the
educator, it is through the firm love and fair guidance of the educator that the
student becomes acquainted first with himself, then with the factual knowledge
to be mastered. It takes a very special quality to become an educator in
Nietzsche's eyes, for educators have the single-most important task in the entire
scheme of the human condition—training those who would be the ubermenschen.
Assuming one thinks of a philosopher as a great educator, powerful 
enough to draw up to his lonely height a long chain of generations, then 
one m ust also grant him the uncanny privileges of the great educator. An 
educator never says what he himself thinks, but always only what he 
thinks of a thing in relation to the requirements of those he educates. He 
must not be detected in this dissimulation; it is part of his mastery that one 
believes in his honesty. He must be capable of employing every means of 
discipline: some he can drive toward the heights only with the whips of 
scorn; others, who are slugglish [sic], irresolute, cowardly, vain, perhaps 
only with exaggerated praise. Such an educator is beyond good and evil; 
but no one must know it.6
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A note about the concept of the ubermenschen: as the dissertation 
elaborates, this concept has nothing to do with the creation of a super-race of 
superior beings, but rather with the creation within the individual of an 
overcoming of the self. It has to do with achievement, with asceticism, with self- 
sacrificing to become, with rigor, with enthusiastic acceptance of one's own fate— 
which Nietzsche calls amor fa ti-and with separation from the mediocrity of the 
"herd" mentality.
The w ord "overman," as the designation of a type of supreme 
achievement, as opposed to "modern" men, to "good" men, to Christians 
and other nihilists-a word that in the mouth of a Zarathustra, the 
annihilator of morality, becomes a very pensive w ord-had  been 
understood almost everywhere with the utmost innocence in the sense of 
those very values whose opposite Zarathustra was meant to represent— 
that is, an "idealistic" type of a higher kind of man, half "saint," half 
"genius."
Other scholarly oxen have suspected me of Darwinism on that 
account. Even the "hero worship" of that unconscious and involuntary 
counterfeiter, Carlyle, which I have repudiated so maliciously, has been 
read into it.7
The ubermensch, the overman, is one who has complete control over personal 
emotions, over herd morality, and who loves personal destiny because he 
participates in it. The rigor to attain such a state of being is harsh, one of extreme 
self-denial in the pursuit of a higher state of personal existence. And for 
Nietzsche, this is the task of the educator—to train all students to strive for the 
higher state of personal being, the state of the ubermensch.
This quest to become such a higher being cannot come about so long as the 
student is bound by traditional concepts of good and evil; thus, Nietzsche 
proposes the state of being which is beyond good and evil. The morality of
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Nietzsche's age made duplicitous overtures to society, so that morals had become 
mere sets of words, so to say. Society espoused one thing and did quite another. 
This fact was epitomized in Nietzsche's sociological pronouncement that God is 
dead! In God's absence, the moral base was left to the preference of those in 
power, whose whimsical caprices created a moral void. Hence, without 
traditional deity-based moral direction, the development of a type of nihilism was 
inevitable. It was not unlike America under Prohibition. While the law of the 
land forbade alcoholic consumption, society quietly ignored that law and 
continued to drink. The net result was a gross disrespect for the law. In 
nineteenth century Germany there had developed, in Nietzsche's eyes, a gross 
disregard for a sense of morality. As such, Nietzsche saw for the absolute need 
to develop a system of moral behavior which transcended that which was extant. 
It was to be developed by and for the ubermensch so that he could survive within 
a new and higher set of moral locutions. Once again, it was the educator who 
m ust instruct the student in the ways of such morality.
Make no mistake about it, Nietzsche was not seeking a master race; rather, 
he was seeking the creation of a newer, a better, a more select, a more moral state 
of the human condition. Those who have hacked away at his philosophy on this 
count have grossly misinterpreted and misunderstood what he was seeking.
Educators, therefore, must recognize their main task as the development 
of such states of being, of such beings. It almost rings like the military recruiting 
slogan, "Be all you can be!" And this, indeed, was Nietzsche's concept of
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education—to accept the student where he was, then bring that student to the 
highest level of his personal development. Such a being would be beyond good 
and evil. Such a being would help create a revaluation of all morals. A revaluation 
of this scope would entail a complete revision of the system of morality to that 
time, and would not be a captive of the herd morality, which Nietzsche saw as 
the product of a "slave mentality." It was the task of education, and of educators, 
to  see to it that this revaluation became entrenched in the development of the 
student.
With this as a foundation, this dissertation examines the conditions of 
contemporary education, compares them with those which Nietzsche found, then 
seeks to propose a revaluation of mete-educational principles for contemporary 
education using Nietzsche's concepts of pedagogy and education as a framework.
5.00 N ature of the Inquiry 
In structuring my dissertation, Nietzschean Pedagogy: A Revaluation for 
Contemporary Education, it has been essential that I establish a broad-based 
qualitative methodology, owing to the specific nature of the inquiry. That nature 
rests within the realms of ethnomethodology and hermeneutic inquiries. This is 
a narrative dissertation within the qualitative approach to research strategies. 
These are appropriate strategies since there is little to be quantified. Its 
verification and validation will come from the structure of the revaluation of 
contemporary education offered in Part the Fifth. Nevertheless, it is important
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to emphasize that this inquiry is philosophical in nature. The quest is more meta- 
educational than educationally method-specific, that is, it is not a "methods 
course" approach. It will be, in short, a treatise in the philosophy of education.
5.01 Dispelling the Perception of Nietzsche as an Anti-Semite
It is important here to add a note as to the nature of Nietzsche's work in 
relation to his having been so misunderstood and misused by others wishing to 
force his philosophy into a political advantage, for we have all been exposed to 
the charge of his anti-Semitism, to the fact of his insanity, and to the fact of his 
obscure and obtuse meanings.
There are a variety of reasons Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy has been 
grossly and patently misunderstood, and, unfortunately, most of those reasons are 
through no fault of his own. The unfortunate fact that he went hopelessly insane 
in 1889, eleven years before his death, is too often overemphasized. That fact is 
that his major works were all published before his insanity occurred, and 
although there were works published after his insanity, they were, nevertheless, 
compiled from notes written prior to his illness. Still, it has remained a major 
obstacle to many who came in contact with Nietzsche. It was as if he were a man 
charged, and convicted, in an ex post facto fashion solely on the basis of this 
illness, when the fact is that the productive portion of his life was in no way 
affected by his insanity. To conclude that the labors of a man gone insane were 
or are to be discounted as mere ravings or meanderings of a lame mind is not
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only ludicrous but also is the mark of an egregiously unacademic approach. It 
is far too simple to reject that which we have difficulty understanding and it is, 
at least, unfortunate to capitalize on such an event as insanity and to incorporate 
it as the major premise for a rejection of the author's work. Thus, it is imperative 
that we refuse any validity to the claim that Nietzsche's works are the mere 
babblings of a lunatic.
One result of Nietzsche's madness which did turn out to be integral in the 
confusion of his philosophy was the fact that his sister, Elizabeth, began to take 
an interest in her brother's work. It is she who emerges in the history of 
Nietzsche's philosophy as the primary villain, for it was through her greed and 
ineptitude the two main misunderstandings of Nietzsche's philosophy evolved. 
Briefly, these two misunderstandings are first, that his philosophy is not coherent, 
and second, that Nietzsche was a Nazi, with all the morbid implications entailed 
when one mentions "Nazi."
In early January, 1889, when Nietzsche was fruitlessly defending a horse 
from being flayed by its master, he collapsed on a street in Turin, Italy, never 
again to recover from insanity. It was in that same year that his sister saw her 
opportunity to, shall we say, "make it," by holding high the star of her brother's 
philosophy which had begun its steep ascent. She had married an anti-Semite, 
Bernhard Forster-a marriage which was strenuously opposed by Nietzsche-and 
had travelled to Paraguay where they established a colony for the preservation 
and perpetuation of the Teutonic Christianity. The colony was called Nueva
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Germania and subscribed faithfully to the twisted racist doctrines which infected
the Third Reich under Hitler and the Nazis. Ultimately, and, perhaps
providentially, the colony had financial difficulties and did not become too
successful. When Forster died, Elizabeth divided her time between the colony
and the Fatherland in an attempt to make her husband a national hero.
About this time, Nietzsche's popularity began to rise somewhat.
Calculating that she could enhance the racist doctrines of her husband, she
changed her name to "Forster-Nietzsche", bought all publishing rights to her
brother's works, and hoarded all his unpublished notes. Thus, with the only final
writings of the rapidly growing philosophy of her brother, she became the
undisputed authority of his works. In order to at least appear an authority she
employed Rudolf Steiner, a Goethe scholar, to tutor her. The following is a
quotation from Walter Kaufmann's Nietzsche, in which Steiner evaluates the
private lessons and Frau Forster-Nietzsche.
The private lessons taught me this above all: that Frau Forster-Nietzsche 
is a complete laywoman in all that concerns her brother's doctrine. [She] 
lacks any sense for fine, and even for crude, logical distinctions; her 
thinking is void of even the least logical consistency; and she lacks any 
sense of objectivity. She believes at every moment what she says. She 
convinces herself today that something was red yesterday that most 
assuredly was blue.8
She further gained unquestioned authority over Nietzsche' works by refusing to
publish certain remaining works.
The consequences were inevitable and obvious, for we experience them
every time Nietzsche's name comes up. His key terms and phrases have all been
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misunderstood—the will to power, master morality, ubermensch, and blonde beast, to 
mention a few—and we find no clear correction until we go to the source and find 
the clarifications. One such source, Ecce Homo, which functions as a kind of 
recollection of thoughts in Nietzsche's works, was withheld from publication by 
Elizabeth. We can easily see why, for there are many passages and notes which 
directly contradict and refute all the poison spread by Elizabeth. While she has 
painted her brother as the proto-type Teutonic son, Nietzsche had rejected such 
a label.
And from what side did all great obstructions, all calamities in my life 
emanate? Always from Germans. The damnable German anti-Semitism, 
this poisonous boil of nevrose nationale, has intruded into my existence 
almost ruinously during that decisive time when not my destiny, but the 
destiny of humanity was at issue. And I owe it to the same element that 
my Zarathustra entered this world as indecent literature—its publisher being 
an anti-Semite. In vain do I look for some sign of tact, of delicatesse, in 
relation to me: from Jews, yes; never yet from Germans.9
As such, we have one major source for much of the controversy which arises over
Nietzsche's works—his own sister, Elizabeth.
Another and more modem misinterpretation comes from a philosophical
hack, Alfred Baumler. Baumler was, in every sense of the word, a nobody in
philosophy until he edited a truly terrible edition of The Will to Power. Being a
Nazi, he was called to the Chair of Philosophy in Berlin when Hitler came into
power. His views of Nietzsche, which were fantastic extensions of Elizabeth's,
became the Nazi doctrine. Of course, power meant subjugation or conquering, the
blonde beast became the blonde-haired, blue-eyed six-foot-plus brute, and master
morality became the master race of Teutons. After the war, these gross
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misinterpretations were never resolved, and The Will to Power was renounced an
evil book. This was in part due to some British philosophers who were still
stinging over comments Nietzsche had made about them and their philosophies.
They saw an opportunity to secure their doctrines by destroying his. Nowhere
was this more obvious than in Bertrand Russell's vivisection, if you will, of
Nietzsche and his position as a philosopher.
Nietzsche, though a professor, was a literary rather than an academic 
philosopher. He invented no new technical theories in ontology or 
epistemology; his importance is primarily in ethics, and secondarily as an 
acute historical critic. His general outlook remained very similar to that 
of Wagner in the Ring; Nietzsche's superman is very like Siegfried, except 
that he knows Greek. This may seem odd, but that is not my fault.
[Nietzsche] attempts to combine two sets of values which are not 
easily harmonized: on the one hand he likes ruthlessness, war, and 
aristocratic pride; on the other hand, he loves philosophy and literature 
and the arts, especially music.
True virtue [for Nietzsche], as opposed to the conventional sort, is 
not profitable or prudent; it isolates its possessor from other men; it is 
hostile to order, and does harm to inferiors. It is necessary for higher men 
to make war upon the masses, and resist the democratic tendencies of the 
age. He prophesied with a certain glee an era of great wars; one wonders 
whether he would have been happy if he had lived to see the fulfillment 
of his prophecy.
He condemns Christian love because he thinks it is an outcome of 
fear. It does not occur to Nietzsche as possible that a man should 
genuinely feel universal love, obviously because he himself feels almost 
universal hatred and fear, which he would fain disguise as lordly 
indifference. His 'noble' man--who is himself in his day-dreams—is a being 
wholly devoid of sympathy, ruthless, cunning, cruel, concerned only with 
his own power. King Lear on the verge of madness, says: 'I will do such 
things—what they are yet I know not—but they shall be the terror of the 
earth.' This is Nietzsche's philosophy in a nutshell.10
Such was the prevailing attitude and general philosophical disposition toward
Nietzsche for over two decades after World War II and the Nazi holocaust.
Nevertheless, all confusion connected with Nietzsche's works is not solely
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due to these previously cited "exemplars of objectivity." It was and is due, also,
to the way Nietzsche writes. He is, in a very real sense, a poet writing as a poet,
using all the obscure metaphors and allusions characteristic of poets. He is not
given to succinctly developing an argument, or to cogently evolving a doctrine.
At times he shouts; at times he admonishes; at times he explodes; and at times
he purposely deludes us in the hope of dragging out a problem. Arthur Danto
describes this style in the preface to his excellent work, Nietzsche as Philosopher.
To dilate and then suddenly to circumscribe the meaning of a word, 
although he likely was not always aware that he was doing so, and was 
at times as misled by what he wrote as his puzzled readers must have 
been. He would take a word, which had a restricted usage, and begin to 
give it a far wider application, using it now to describe things that had 
never been seen as falling within the meaning of that term before. Then, 
having immensely widened the scope of the word, he would force it back 
into the context from which it was originally taken. The context is then 
charged with an overload of conceptual energy it was not made to 
withstand.11
It is easy to understand how Nietzsche has been misunderstood through the 
misgiven efforts of his sister, Baumler, and the Nazis, and through his own 
aphoristic style of writing and of devising a system of philosophy.
Perhaps this notation has belabored the point, and I do not wish to appear 
an overzealous proselyte posing as an apologist, but the facts of history are 
designed, I believe, precisely to add to our understanding of a given circumstance 
or author. Nietzsche is no exception. The heartening aspect of rejuvenated 
studies of Nietzsche is that they have uniformly vindicated his position and his 
philosophy. The efforts of the late Professor Walter Kaufmann of Princeton, the 
work of Professor Arthur Danto of Columbia, and of Professor Richard Schacht
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
of the University of Illinois, to mention a few, have been monumental in bringing 
Nietzsche's star back on the rise—and rightly so.
5.02 Defining Pedagogy and Revaluation
It is appropriate in any inquiry of this kind to offer clarifications of major 
terms so that the arguments presented within it are not lost owing to lack of clear 
definition. One such term for this inquiry is pedagogy, which is used extensively 
here. Through history it has referred to teaching approaches, methods, and 
strategies. I have used it here in a broader context, adapting it to Nietzschean 
concepts. In the same vein, I will use the term pedagogist as opposed to the term 
pedagogue, since the latter term implies a certain imperialistic bent, which I believe 
is not compatible with either Nietzschean philosophy of education or with mine. 
A pedagogist, then, refers to the educator who sees his position as guide to the 
learner, as opposed to being the "font of knowledge" from which the learner is 
obliged to drink. This definition is in line with Nietzschean thought. At the same 
time, I shall take pedagogy to mean the art of teaching, including those methods, 
approaches, strategies, and attitudes associated with imparting knowledge to the learner.
Another vital point of definitional clarification needs to be made with 
regard to the use of the term revaluation. Nietzsche took revaluation to mean a 
restructuring of the old order, which included, for him, the complete revamping of 
our approaches to a given set of circumstances. His primary concern was with 
the revaluation of values. His quest, as the quotation from Thus Spoke Zarathustra
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cited at the beginning of this Part suggests, was to surpass the concept of "man" 
and move on to an "over-man". He did this with the concepts of morality, as 
well. Again, it was to be the task of the educator to bring about the attitudes and 
persuasions which would create the ubermensch, the "over-man". In effect, it was 
a revaluation of "man", to which I prefer to name the human condition. I will adopt 
this approach in offering my revaluation of contemporary education. To reiterate, 
this inquiry is mete-educational and philosophical in nature and, as such, the 
structure of the revaluation will be philosophical.
5.03 The Seven Corollaries for a Revaluation of Contemporary Education
In concluding this Part it seems appropriate to offer a summation of my 
revaluation of contemporary education. Such revaluation will be presented in the 
form of Corollaries for Revaluation in the concluding chapter of this dissertation.
Corollaries for a Revaluation of Contemporary Education
1. While the learner is to be the focus of education, the object of 
education is a quest of taking the learner beyond the confines of 
collective and individual mediocrity.
2. The educator is a guide for the attainment of the higher state of 
being in the learner.
3. Education is analogous to a Rorschach Ink Blot interpretation.
4. Learning is an internal process; teaching is an external process.
5. Values are inherently interwoven into the fabric of education, but 
are socially motivated and, as such, are trapped.
6. The structure of education must serve the development of the 
learner, not the preservation of the state. It must provide for a 
curriculum which fosters the development of creativity and critical 
thinking.
7. Elitism does not imply privilege. It demands service.
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the literature which I have discovered is illuminating and extensive.
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Part the Second: Review of the Pertinent Literature
1.00 General Assessment of the Literature
Any review of researched literature indicates the precedents which have 
been set and established by previous academic researchers in the particular area 
of inquiry. This review should also offer a groundwork, a foundation from which 
the searcher within the inquiry can base observations, perceptions, and 
conclusions. In so doing, the searcher will simultaneously establish the 
framework of the inquiry, the limits of the inquiry, and the strategy of the 
inquiry. This review of pertinent literature is no exception and will adhere to 
these principles.
Attempts to categorize Friedrich Nietzsche's works have eluded 
philosophical scholars for at least eight decades. His pronouncements on all 
aspects of the human condition are broad-based, eclectic, and aphoristic in their 
presentations. Add to this dilemma the task of isolating his theories on education 
and pedagogy, then finding a common thread applicable to education today, and 
we have a rather formidable endeavor for research.
It was obvious that the first undertaking in this dissertation, Nietzschean 
Pedagogy: A Revaluation for Contemporary Education, was to establish the condition 
in which we find our educational institutions today. This condition, it must be
29
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added, is taken as a whole: that is to say, the overall condition of education as it 
is operating presently. It is indisputable that there are obvious pockets of truly 
excellent education-in the Nietzschean sense-which are thriving in the United 
States today; however, it is the composite picture with which this inquiry is 
concerned. Literature here is plentiful and is examined in Section 2.00.
The literature on Nietzsche's educational philosophy has been obscured by 
the misuse of his works for various reasons, as cited in Part The First, Section 
5.01. However, in the last three decades, a great deal of research has yielded a 
most interesting treasure trove revealing the great emphasis which Nietzsche 
placed on education. Until the past thirty years, his concepts of pedagogy had 
been attributed primarily to Thus Spoke Zarathustra; however, much more has been 
found in works such as Schopenhauer As Educator, Twilight of the Idols, and "On 
The Future of our Educational Institutions" which was presented in a series of 
five lectures. Section 3.00 analyzes these works, as well as works by David E. 
Cooper, Ann Margaret Sharp, Timothy Murphy, and Martin Simons, to mention 
a few here.
The synthesis of these two research tasks presents the overall framework 
and conceptual structure of the dissertation. Essentially, it cites the circumstances 
of our present-day educational institutions, makes a thorough examination of 
Nietzsche's concept of education, hence his pedagogy, and then applies these 
concepts in presenting a framework for the revaluation of the principles for our 
educational system in the form of seven Corollaries for a Revaluation of
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Contemporary Education.
2.00 Literature on Contemporary Education
Little needs to be said when it comes to a contemporary assessment of 
where our educational institutions are today with respect to performance. It has 
been established time and again by countless articles in journals, professional 
magazines, on television documentaries, and in Hollywood productions. At the 
same time, since our educational institution is an extension of the society which 
it serves, it is obvious that our schools are mere microcosms in which fester the 
greater social problems, but the schools project them more vividly since that is 
where we seem to focus on solutions—noble, but futile, since schools are, for all 
intents and purposes, controlled laboratories reflecting the problems, and the 
agents of change, in this instance the students, are ill-equipped to solve these 
overwhelming problems. Nevertheless, the extant problems of technological 
change, bureaucratic ineptitude within school systems, confused curriculum, and 
more confusing general leadership and direction within education have left 
American education in the final three decades of the twentieth century desperate 
for re-assessm ent-in much need of a serious and concerted revaluation.
Benjamin Barber, alluded to in Part The First, has contributed a great deal 
to the concept of some type of revaluation of our educational system in his 
extensive article "America Skips School: W hy We Talk So Much About Education 
and Do So Little", which appeared in the November 1993 edition of Harper's
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Magazine. In it he outlined the facts of technology, funding, curriculum, and
moral duplicity on the part of society in  actually doing something about
education. He also touched upon an aspect of education which Nietzsche
constantly analyzed, the concept of liberty. Although Nietzsche eschews liberty
as a "slave mentality" perception, he, nonetheless, believes that the ultimate
position to which we can educate our students is to a level which is beyond such
concepts. Yet, without such a concept as a genesis for argument we cannot
proceed to that next higher level of hum an existence. This is where Barber's
application of education to liberty applies.
The fundamental task of education in a democracy is what Tocqueville 
once called the apprenticeship of liberty: learning to be free. I wonder 
whether Americans still believe liberty has to be learned and that its skills 
are worth learning. Or have they been deluded by two centuries of 
rhetoric into thinking that freedom is "natural" and can be taken for 
granted?1
This is a similar query posed by Nietzsche, who recognized the disintegration of 
societal values in the educational institutions of his day. His solution was radical 
in that it proposed a complete revaluation of society, and of all morality, as well.
Identifying a problem is sufficient in some circumstances; however, just to 
identify a problem in an institution so vital to our survival is not enough. 
Solutions can only come about when we isolate the causes. Having done this, we 
can debate the validity of various solutions. Identifying causes for the 
unfortunate condition of schools in America today has been an open field for 
researchers, none of whom seem to have taken the view of the big picture. 
Jonathan Kozol has identified some of the causes from a socio-economic
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perspective in his major work, Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools 
published in 1991. This book posits the thesis that it has been through 
segregation and disproportionate funding that education, particularly in the major 
cities, has been on the decline. In a paper which Kozol delivered to the National 
Seminar of the Education Writers Association in 1988, he claims that more 
funding is necessary to re-establish quality education in our inner cities. Merely 
throwing money at a problem does not solve it, particularly in a society such as 
ours which is so bureaucratized. Nevertheless, Kozol does point us in one 
direction worth considering, but applicable only in that it helps to set the stage, 
if you will, for the justification of the revaluation of education.
Bruce Joyce, another prominent education writer, looks to the improvement 
of staff development, as well to an amalgamation of all parties involved in the 
operations of our school systems as the major vehicle for bringing about necessary 
changes in education. In Changing School Culture through Staff Development 
published in 1990, he argues that "staff development will become a human 
resource development system designed to change the nature of schooling, the 
status of its personnel, and their relations with each other."2 In effect, if we do 
not change the staff, we will not change the schools. In 1993, Joyce published The 
Self-Renewing School in which, again, he posits the necessity of establishing staff 
development in the creation of solutions to educational problems. There is more 
to it, however, and he goes on to state that "the interests of the educators and 
children as learners are intertwined."3 In so doing, Joyce becomes more
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Nietzschean than he might otherwise have imagined, since Nietzsche, too, calls
for superiority in a teacher. Using staff development as a springboard to effect
change for the good is an element of which Zarathustra, himself, would be proud.
Nevertheless, neither Kozol nor Joyce take their concepts far enough, for both of
them are still bound to the concept of equality as the necessary by-product of
education. Some will argue that this equality is more one of opportunity, but it
is, rather, a justification for mediocrity. In effect, we have become more
preoccupied with reducing one student's ability in order to raise that of another.
The rationale has been this quest for equality of opportunity, but has the awful
reductio ad absurdum of producing equal success, not merely opportunity. The
finish line in an analogous sense has been moved farther away from those with
ability so that those with lesser ability can finish with "equal" performance.
Nietzsche would not agree.
Another reason for the cause of our failing school systems is offered by
Seymour Sarason in The Predictable Failure of Educational Reform: Can We change
Course before It's Too Late? Sarason claims that our schools are inherently opposed
to change and that reformers within the system have not been able to cope with,
address, or confront this inability to change.
Schools have been intractable to change and the attainment of goals set by 
reformers. A major failure has been the inability of reformers to confront 
this intractability. As a result, each new wave of reform learns nothing 
from earlier efforts and comes up with recommendations that have failed 
in the past.4
Confrontation is a major vehicle for change within the Nietzschean system, and
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for us to deal with change in the system requires confrontation. Still, there are
those whose timid souls allow them to develop their systems for change in the
vacuum of their own, limited perceptions of the problem. Thus, we find that
Sarason would be at home, so to speak, within a Nietzschean system.
Supporting Sarason on the issue of confrontation are David W. Johnson
and Roger T. Johnson who believe that conflict enhances the development of
critical thinking. In "Creative and Critical Thinking through Academic
Controversy," which was published in the September-October 1993 issue of
American Behavioral Scientist, they believe fervently that it is through conflict and
controversy that students begin to develop effective critical thinking skills.
The dozens of studies conducted indicate that students who participate in 
an academic controversy recall more correct information, are better able to 
transfer learning to new situations, use more complex and higher-level 
reasoning strategies in recalling and transferring information learned, and 
are better able to generalize the principles they learned to a wider variety 
of situations.5
Again, we have a Nietzschean concept surfacing unbeknownst to the authors of 
the article. The concept of stressing the student, not in an emotional sense, but 
in a cognitive sense, will allow the student to develop more freely those inherent 
qualities with which he was born. It exhibits to the student the necessity of 
looking beyond the specifics of the problem to a higher realm of solution. In so 
doing, the student transcends the banality of the herd and seeks a harbor in the 
relevance of the solution to the self.
Technology has always been looked upon with jealousy, suspicion, and 
blatant disdain by many in the education establishment. Nietzsche saw
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technology as another means by which humanity was to be stripped of its spirit. 
Today, however, technology can be seen as a very viable tool for the delivery of 
knowledge. We have found that the computer, CD-ROM, and video technology 
can make lessons more relevant and more meaningful. However, technology is 
just that~a tool-a n d  any attempts to create it as an end unto itself are doomed to 
a dismal demise, for the human condition should never abdicate its place in God's 
nature. Peter Shaw sets the record straight on this count in "The Competitiveness 
Illusion: Does Our Country Need to be Literate in Order to be Competitive? If 
Not, Why Not?", which appeared in the January 18,1993, issue of National Review. 
In this article he documents the decline of test scores from pre-World War II to 
the present and attributes it to our fascination, indeed, our infatuation with 
"technical training". This type of training replaces critical thinking with reaction, 
in a stimulus-response fashion; thus, traditional education became almost 
obsolete. The effects of this have produced a workforce which has more time on 
its hands, is more productive, but is less aware of its place in the grand scheme 
of operations.
Diversion from the basics has made the remainder of life less interesting 
as well. Workers in factories lack not the specific skills to do their jobs, 
but rather the ability to analyze their places in the larger scheme of things 
in their industry, region, country, and historical period.6
It is just this type of loss of overall vision of the self in relation to the whole that
Nietzsche so vehemently opposed in his own era. It would mean the loss of a
sense of being, of humanity. He charged that this type of "training" would
reinforce the supremacy of the state and would do little more than to preserve the
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mediocrity of the status quo. There could be no better restatement of a feeling of
Nietzsche's than the final paragraph of Shaw's article.
In educationese—where special means ordinary, excellence means 
mediocrity, and enrichment means deprivation of knowledge-reform in 
the name of twenty-first-century competitiveness means continued erosion 
of reading, writing, and arithmetic. Those condemned to pass through a 
system with these distorted values will continue making do on their own. 
But it would be interesting to see what they might make of themselves if, 
for a change, their education supplied them with the proper tools.7
It w ould seem as if Nietzsche himself had dictated these words.
In sum, then, the literature I have reviewed in an effort to examine the
different perceptions of the problems, which most of us acknowledge, being
experienced by our educational system today, seems to be a body in sincere quest
for some solutions. Owing to the burdens of a society which does not deliver on
its promises to education, either materially or spiritually, these agents of change,
these reformers, fall short more through a lack of consistent resolve, rather than
lack of a cogent philosophical system. They all seem to want to change the
system with a few, minor adjustments; yet, they all touch upon some aspect of
Nietzschean educational philosophy.
3.00 Literature on Nietzsche 
Few philosophers have been as misused and misinterpreted as Nietzsche, 
and few have been so mischaracterized for political gains. As was pointed out 
in Part The First, Section 5.01, Nietzsche was summarily dismissed for many 
years, particularly following World War II with its Nazi menace, and only in the
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he richly deserves.
3.01 Works which Analyze and Explicate Nietzsche's Works
Beginning with What Nietzsche Means published in 1941 by Professor 
George A. Morgan, we began to see a more academic examination of Nietzsche's 
works and life. Morgan laid the foundation for an analysis free of the anti-Nazi 
prejudice which for so long haunted Nietzsche's body of work. This text was a 
good beginning.
Perhaps no one to date has done more to clarify and enhance the status of
Nietzsche in the West than the late Professor Walter Kaufmann of Princeton
University. In 1950, he published Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist.
It was not only this text which has vindicated Nietzsche's position in philosophy,
but it was also the many translations, notes, and commentaries which Kaufmann
published which helped to establish the legitimacy of Nietzsche's work. Professor
Richard Schacht, Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the
University of Illinois and former student of Kaufmann's, has stated,
H e did more than anyone else in our part of the world has done to rescue 
Nietzsche from both his unjust detractors and his ill-motivated abusers, 
and to gain for him the attention and appreciation he deserves.8
Kaufmann's dedication to the accurate presentation of Nietzsche began with his
attention to Nietzsche as a person. I corresponded with Professor Kaufmann in
1969 requesting, among other things, advice on the best approach to teaching
Nietzsche, since I was teaching Existentialism at the University of Delaware and
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1969 requesting, among other things, advice on the best approach to teaching
Nietzsche, since I was teaching Existentialism at the University of Delaware and
wanted so very much to present him appropriately. Professor Kaufmann
corresponded to me:
A few suggestions for an approach to Nietzsche in your lectures: begin by 
bringing to life the man as a person, talk about his significance and 
influence, give an overview of his books, including those not assigned, 
outline the development of this thought, and then discuss with some care 
selected chapters in Zarathustra.9
Thus, Professor Walter Kaufmann emerged as, and continues to be, the most
authoritative scholar on Nietzsche in the West.
In 1965 two separate books were published which continued the
restoration, if you will, of Nietzsche's image on this continent. Professor Arthur
Danto of Columbia University published Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original
Study, in which Danto analyzed Nietzsche's works with the rigor usually
associated with philosophical pursuits. He did not pay much attention to the
negative image Nietzsche's works had acquired, but explicated his philosophy
with the respect any other figure in philosophy would be accorded. Danto paid
more attention to the nature of Nietzsche's philosophy.
Nietzsche was more than a critic of concept and a word-tormenting 
anarchist. He tried to construct a philosophy consistent with the 
extraordinary openness he felt was available to man, or at least a 
philosophy that would entail this openness as one of its consequences.10
It was a study principally concerned with the implications of Nietzsche's thought
as philosophy, and not with the political ramifications of how others had
misconstrued this thought.
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The other book published in 1965 was Professor RJ.Hollingdale's Nietzsche:
The Man and. His Philosophy. This study offers a solid background in the
development of Nietzsche's thought. Still, Hollingdale felt compelled to justify
Nietzsche's works in his Preface in light of the onslaught of destructive crusades
being waged against Nietzsche at the time. Hollingdale calls the image
attributed to Nietzsche prior to recent examinations of his works the pseudo-
Nietzsche, which had been created by the Nazis and other anti-Semites. At the
same time, Hollingdale intimates a certain element which put Nietzsche ahead of
his time, after a fashion.
The cataclysm which wrecked the pseudo-Nietzsche was also responsible 
for the revival of the real Nietzsche: the reawakening of interest in him 
was closely connected with the recollection that the spiritual void of the 
1940's was not merely prophesied in his philosophy but was actually its 
presupposition: Nietzsche started from the point Europe had just reached.11
This observation was perhaps the most perceptive which could have been made 
with respect to the restoration of Nietzsche's works. It clearly puts a mark of 
connected realization on his works, which was beginning to crystallize in the 
thinking of Western philosophical scholars.
A most excellent study of Nietzsche was published in 1983 by Professor 
Richard Schacht, titled simply Nietzsche. This work is more in line with that 
which we assume philosophy to be; that is to say, it is not preoccupied with the 
vindication of Nietzsche. It is written in the same spirit we find in Danto's work: 
Friedrich Nietzsche was a legitimate philosopher who had a wide-ranging system 
which deserves appropriate inquiry. The preoccupation with justifying
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work. More importantly, however, is the observation Schacht makes with regard
to the eclectic nature of Nietzsche's philosophy, as well as to the organization of
Nietzsche's presentations and investigations.
He did a prodigious amount of writing, and dealt with as broad a range 
of matters as almost anyone ever has. In addition to the considerable 
number of works he published and prepared for publication, he left a great 
mass of notes, which scholars undoubtedly will be mining for generations, 
and which can neither be entirely ignored nor easily digested. And even 
the work he completed for the most part consist chiefly in assemblages of 
rather loosely connected notes rather than sustained arguments and 
systematic treatments of particular topics. He had a great deal to say, 
about a great many things; and no single study can take account of more 
than a part of it.12
Little can be added to this observation: suffice it to say that through the efforts 
of Morgan, Kaufmann, Danto, Hollingdale, and Schacht, the restoration of 
Nietzsche's position based upon the content of his thought is an accomplishment 
well deserved and long overdue.
3.02 Specific Works in Nietzsche which Expound His Educational Philosophy 
For many years the educational philosophy of Nietzsche was assumed to 
have been presented and thoroughly explicated in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In 1983, 
Professor David E. Cooper of the University of Surrey published the first 
comprehensive study of Nietzsche's educational philosophy under the title, 
Authenticity and Learning: Nietzsche's Educational Philosophy. It is dealt with in 
more detail in Section 3.03, but suffice it here to say that Cooper's work revealed 
that while Zarathustra offers an example of what educators are to emulate it did 
not offer a succinct system for educational institutions. Additionally, while
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not offer a succinct system for educational institutions. Additionally, while 
Zarathus tra himself is the pinnacle of pedagogical prowess and art, his aphoristic 
style is often cryptic at points which seem crucial to the development of his 
"system", if it can be so termed. It may very well be, as some scholars believe, 
that Zarathustra is Nietzsche, and therein lies some of the explanation for the 
obscurity we encounter in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. At any rate, it is now 
acknowledged that there are some very significant other works of Nietzsche's 
which have had greater bearing on the development of his educational 
philosophy, and which further provide for a framework of a system, such as it is.
Nietzsche published educational analyses at least eight years prior to 
Zarathustra, and in far less obscure language than appears in that book. Between 
1873 and 1876, Nietzsche completed four essays of an originally planned thirteen, 
which would appear as Untimely Meditations. Two of his major treatises having 
to do specifically with education appear in Meditations, "On the Uses and 
Disadvantages of History for Life"—sometimes translated as "On the Use and 
Abuse of History"—and "Schopenhauer as Educator." The first of these treats such 
subjects in education as how history relates to science, the purposes and necessity 
of creating critical thinkers, of the importance of making education as scholarship 
an active enterprise, that is making it practical and relevant, and of how 
education was to survive the times in which it existed. "Schopenhauer" discusses, 
in great length, models of education which are "child-centered", the pedagogical 
significance of studying great figures in history, the place and importance of
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studying philosophy as a rudimentary aspect of any curriculum, and of the 
precarious relationship between the state and the institution of education. These 
two works contribute more than any other systematic work by Nietzsche to the 
development of a fundamental pedagogy which can be identified as his.
In a series of five public lectures, published as "On the Future of Our 
Educational Institutions", Nietzsche amplified those points made in the essays in 
Meditations. Additionally, Nietzsche commented here on such topics as the 
obligations of an educator in a weak, or even bad, educational system; on the 
inherent contradiction between a "true"—"liberal arts"—education and a more 
"utilitarian "-"technical"-education designed solely to "make a better living"; and 
on the "sacred obligations" of mastering one's own language as a means of 
procreating both education and culture. These five lectures provide a solid basis 
upon which a revaluation of educational institutions could comfortably rest. They 
add "muscle," if you will, to the skeletal framework of Nietzsche's educational 
philosophy established in his earlier works.
At or around the time of the publication of Zarathustra, Nietzsche had 
explicitly discussed and analyzed education and pedagogy in other works. Two 
essays are of significance here: "We Scholars" in Beyond Good and Evil, and "What 
the Germans Lack" in Twilight of the Idols. "Scholars" presents barbed comments 
on the place of "science"—"scholarship"—in philosophy in a fashion which really 
is a critique on educational approaches to all disciplines, and comments on the 
acquisition of knowledge as being an inherently good enterprise for its own sake.
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"Germans" is a biting and sarcastic attack upon the society and culture of 
Nietzsche's day, which focuses upon its educational institutions, functions, and 
pedagogy. Ironically, it is entirely possible to substitute the nationalistic 
nomenclature "Americans" for "Germans" and find very little difference between 
Nietzsche's nineteenth century Germany and our twentieth going on twenty first 
century America. The educational atmospheres are strikingly similar.
There are also some important comments having to do with education 
which were posthumously collected, translated, and published as The Will to 
Power. While the observations in this publication are appropriate and timely, they 
are fragmentary and act more in a verifying capacity for the other works 
Nietzsche published on the philosophy of education.
The works which Nietzsche published on educational philosophy are all 
consistent with his attacks upon the nihilistic mind-set which had emerged during 
his era in Germany. They have been relatively neglected until the past two 
decades due in part to the animosity, already cited, created by the 
misinterpretations and misuses of his philosophy. Additionally, many of the 
translations of Nietzsche's positions w ith respect to education have been woefully 
inadequate. Perhaps even more significantly, this neglect has been due to 
scholars not having taken Nietzsche's views of education as a serious aspect of 
his concern. This, too, seems myopic at best, since we cannot take Nietzsche's 
concepts out of their global-context so clearly intended by their creator. The 
philosopher, by definition, m ust be concerned with the tasks and goals of
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also as an epistemological process preoccupied with cognitive genealogy. This, 
then, has been the significance of Nietzsche's contribution to the philosophy of 
education—the recognition of its vital position in the culture from which it 
emerges, as well as its charge to create the ubermensch, a human phenomenon 
within, yet beyond, the human condition.
3.03 Works which Analyze Nietzsche's Philosophy of Education
As was cited in Section 3.02, Professor David E. Cooper's 1983 publication
of Authenticity and Learning: Nietzsche's Educational Philosophy is arguably the best
and most intense examination of Nietzsche's concepts of education. The book has
three main goals: to present an overview of Nietzsche's philosophy, to present an
investigation into Nietzsche's long-neglected views on education, and to evolve
an effective appraisal of contemporary education with Nietzsche's philosophy of
education as a backdrop and foundation. In an effort to either illuminate or to
make more cryptic, Cooper's comment on the sub-title of this excellent book in
the Preface seems very Nietzschean in and of itself.
The expression "educational philosophy" in the sub-title of this book is 
intended to be ambiguous: to refer both to a philosophy of education and 
to the gearing of a whole philosophy to an educative enterprise.13
This sets the pace for a most enlightening explication of Nietzsche's philosophy
of education, which is intrinsically interwoven with the notion of authenticity.
Authenticity is a quest for illum ination-the true self m ust be allowed to 
shine through, and the attempts made to harmonize one's life with its 
dictates as a journey, through a jungle of distracting, false selves, towards 
the real one.14
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dictates as a journey, through a jungle of distracting, false selves, towards 
the real one.14
It is this concept which Cooper chooses to illustrate in his book rather than to 
succinctly define, and in so doing he makes the point, again, in a very Nietzschean 
fashion.
Cooper concurs with my assertion that there are some disconcerting
parallels between our socio-economic and political climates and those extant in
Nietzsche's nineteenth century Germany. As a case in point, Cooper's chapter on
"Nature and Technicism"—the latter term being borrowed from Ortega y Gassett—
focuses upon the problem of technology and government in collusion to protect
the status quo. It is a theme not really articulated as well in our contemporary
societal complex, more, I think, as a result of the liability it would suffer if it were
to be so exposed. Nevertheless, it is more than adequately defined by Cooper,
and serves well as an indicator of the tenor of his book.
By "technicism" I mean the broad, but identifiable, idea that the 
technological power at men's disposal is the fundamental feature of our 
times, and that their energies should primarily be directed towards 
utilizing this power for the sake of increased material welfare. In its 
political incarnation, technicism is the view that a prime role of 
government is to harness this power and channel these energies; a role 
which people's over-riding desire for increased material well-being gives 
it a mandate to perform. (How government is to play this role, whether 
as star of the show or discreetly from the wings, remains disputed.) In its 
educational form, technicism is the view that the main purpose of schools 
and higher institutions is to train people to contribute and accommodate 
to a society governed by the general technicist idea. It is not that everyone 
is to be a trained technologist, but that everyone is to be trained or 
prepared for filling the roles demanded in a technicist society. Hoteliers 
and caterers are not technologists, but there is an increasing demand for 
them in a technicist society; so that, in keeping with this educational idea, 
we find it urged that people be trained in these jobs at colleges and
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universities, at the likely expense of more traditional subjects deemed less 
relevant to m odem  life.15
Cooper's work sets a solid foundation for my position in that it dearly presents
and analyzes Nietzsche's views of education in a manner not available before, for
reasons previously dted. It also vaulted Cooper to the position of being the
preeminent authority on Nietzsche's philosophy of education.
Another publication of Cooper's took to task two authors who had placed
Nietzsche's educational philosophy squarely in the realm of Thus Spoke
Zarathustra. Haim Gordon's "Nietzsche's Zarathustra as Educator" and Keith
Jenkins' "The Dogma of Nietzsche's Zarathustra", both published in The Journal
of Philosophy of Education, were the object of Cooper's article, "On Reading
Nietzsche on Education", which also appeared in this journal. As was previously
dted, Zarathustra is more an example of an educator, rather than a treatise of an
educational system. Both Gordon and Jenkins were entrenched in an analysis
solely dependent upon the observations of Zarathustra. In this regard, according
to Cooper, both miss the point.
A remarkable feature of both papers is that neither mentions a single one 
of Nietzsche's several writings which are explicitly about education, in the 
familiar sense of having to do with schools, subjects, universities, and so 
on.16
Cooper goes on to cite other misconceptions presented by Gordon and Jenkins, 
one of the more common of which is that Nietzsche was a proponent of "child- 
centered" education, which is clearly not what Nietzsche had in mind. Still, the 
thrust of his artide is that there is much more to Nietzschean pedagogy than
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Zarathustra's quips and queries.
One of the more engaging and concise articles dealing with the socio-
politico-economic atmosphere in which Nietzsche found his educational
institutions was published by Ann Margaret Sharp in Humanitas under the title
"Education and Culture: A Nietzschean Perspective". She has been quoted in
Part the First, Section 2.00, but here suffice it to say that her analysis makes full
application of Nietzsche's philosophy as it focuses upon education, including the
concepts of freedom and the evolution of an elite based upon the notion of
educating for the ubermensch, or, as I prefer to term it, the higher state of the
human condition. This higher state of being in the human condition entails a
certain refinement of "culture"; in a Nietzschean sense, the appreciation of the
entirety of one's condition coupled with the ability to surpass it.
Culture for Nietzsche is a life long process of growing in knowledge and 
power manifest in action. Of its very essence it involves pain, suffering 
and the destruction that is involved with all creation. Man alone has the 
ability to overcome his nature and create himself whole. It is this creation 
of wholeness which justifies his very existence.17
Understanding what Nietzsche means by the concept of culture is vital in the
apprehension of his concept of education. Sharp offers a most comprehensive
view of Nietzschean pedagogy with his conception of culture as background and
foundation.
In another article, "The Teacher as Liberator: A Nietzschean View", Sharp 
presents the concept that it is the educator, as pedagogist who "liberates" the 
learner from ignorance, to self-overcoming. This concept is presented in Part the
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Fourth, Sections 1.02, 2.04, and 4.02. It examines the role of love between the 
pedagogist and the learner, as well as the three stages of spiritual development 
offered by Nietzsche in Thus Spoke Zarathustra—the camel, the lion, and the child.
Timothy M urphy's dissertation, Teaching the Dance: Nietzsche as Educator, 
examines Nietzsche's philosophy of education and finds that it is to be found 
throughout the entire body of his work. This philosophy is embodied in teaching 
the dance, which combines all the attributes of a being who is educated. A 
further analysis of M urphy's work is found in Part the Fourth, Section 4.03.
An interesting and enlightening observation on Nietzsche's educational 
philosophy was presented by Martin Simons in his article "Montessori, Superman, 
and Catwoman," published in Educational Theory (Summer 1988). Few of us were 
aware of the influence which Nietzsche had on the development of Marie 
Montessori's educational concerns and philosophy. Simons reveals her as a 
kindred spirit of Nietzsche's, in that both of them fostered the concept of 
individuality as well as the importance of personal effort in overcoming any 
difficulties or obstacles to be faced. This article also offers an analysis of why 
Nietzsche felt that female "emancipation" during his time was misdirected: 
women should have developed within the framework of their own conceptions 
of what they should have been, not as mere reflections of already mediocre men. 
Montessori shared this conception, as well as a conception of the development of 
the ubermensch. The following passage from Simons' article serves to establish the 
understanding and appreciation Montessori exhibited for Nietzsche.
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Montessori mentioned a passage from Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
where, as she understood, woman asks man, "Why do you desire me?" 
If it was for the sake of mere companionship, the male was to be 
dismissed. Something more important than love was envisaged: "I wish 
the man who has conquered himself, who has made his soul great. I wish 
the man who has conserved a clean and robust body. I wish the man who 
desires to unite with me, body and soul, to create a son! A son better, 
more perfect, stronger, than any created heretofore." Nietzsche cried: 
"Man is a thing to be surmounted. What have you done to surmount 
him?" Montessori:
To better the species consciously, cultivating his own health, his own virtue, this 
should be the goal of a man's married life. It is a sublime concept of which, as 
yet, few think. And the socialised home of the future, living provident, kindly; 
educator and comforter; is the true and worthy home of those human mates who 
wish to better the species, and to set the race forward triumphant into the eternity 
of life.18
Discovering this article was a revelation for me, but having reflected upon the 
reality of it, I do not find it so surprising that Nietzsche's thinking should have 
influenced Montessori's. It was here, too, that I found some solid insights as to 
my Corollaries for the Revaluation of Contemporary Education.
In all, the literature available for an adequate investigation into the 
possibilities for applying Nietzschean concepts to a contemporary educational 
system is most appropriate and impressive. While I had believed that the idea 
had its genesis within my corpus of thinking, it is obvious that it has had its 
proponents all along. However, they have not attempted a direct application of 
Nietzschean pedagogy evolving into a definitive system of philosophical 
education. Perhaps Cooper, Sharp, and Murphy come closest, and perhaps 
Montessori prepared a type of application but, in the final analysis, there is still 
much work to do. The parallels of the circumstances of Nietzsche's Nineteenth 
Century Germany and contemporary America are striking. While the specifics
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of these parallels are different, the overall effects of technology and state control 
of education are the same. As such, the legacy of a Nietzschean pedagogy can 
be seen to have a significant bearing on the future course of educational 
endeavors not only in the United States, but also in the industrialized world as 
well.
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Part the Third: Inquiry Strategy
1.00 Methodology 
The inquiry strategy, as methodology, has been briefly outlined in Part the 
First, Section 5.00, for this dissertation, Nietzschean Pedagogy: A Revaluation for 
Contemporary Education. Owing to the nature of this inquiry, it was necessary to 
establish a broad-based qualitative methodology. This nature is one which dictates 
that the inquiry be firmly fixed within the realms of ethnomethodology-in that 
it is an examination of given sociological phenomena as reflective of and reflected 
by education—and hermeneutics~in that it is a philosophical analysis of the 
conditions which best facilitate the establishment and structure of an effective and 
efficient educational system. The dissertation is presented in a narrative format 
within the designs of these research strategies. These approaches are appropriate 
since there is little to be quantified with respect to population samples and the 
like. The argument could very well be presented, nevertheless, that, since the 
research here depends upon assumptions made with respect to contemporary 
education, the methodology should rest within quantitative evaluations. In a very 
limited sense, this m ay have application; however, the fundamental research task 
here is to find those philosophical principles which devise an overall framework 
and structure as an approach to pedagogy and education. Relying upon 
quantification to achieve this seems futile to me since quantification is always a
54
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measurement post hoc, and predictions derived from such data can be very static. 
Thus, the methodology in this dissertation will rely upon qualitative principles 
which allow much more latitude in interpretation and application. It will, as an 
intended consequence, present a more dynamic, more impacting, and more vivid 
dissertation. As such, its verification and validity will come from the structure 
of the revaluation of modern education which is posited in the Corollaries in Part 
the Fifth, Section 3.00.
Consistently then, it is important to emphasize that this inquiry is, of 
necessity, philosophical in approach, analysis, research, design, and conclusion. 
The investigation rests more in the domain of meta-education rather than in 
method-specific education-that is to say, it does not offer an analysis of method 
specifics. As such, this dissertation is a treatise in the philosophy of education, as 
opposed to being a dogmatic analysis of some quantifiable, extant circumstance 
of education. That approach has always seemed to me to be, shall I say, "looking 
at the world through the rearview mirror." The revaluation refers to extant 
circumstances of contemporary education solely as a point of departure, and not 
as a recounting of the events of the journey which may have brought us to this 
point.
2.00 Intent
The overall intent of this dissertation is to examine the works of the 
nineteenth century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche in the areas of the
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philosophy of education and of pedagogy, and then to propose his ideology to
contemporary education with the aim of offering a viable option as an alternative
to what presently exists. It is the hope of this inquiry that a revaluation will clear
he mists which have obstructed the primary goal of education-that is, to develop
and to generate individuals who are creative and who are critical thinkers.
It is appropriate here to justify the use of the term revaluation, in that it
might seem far too radical a notion to be associated with education. I have
borrowed this term directly from Nietzsche. It was his estimation that the values
of his age were inadequate and had produced little else than the nihilism which,
for Nietzsche, had brought the ruination of the human condition. In order to
escape this tragic situation, he presented the concept of the revaluation of all
values. Ironically, it was not his aim to necessarily legislate another system of
values. H e was unalterably opposed to the status quo, which, in his view, had
held the hum an condition hostage to a value system undermining all that the
human condition could achieve. Rather than a re-legislation of values, he
proposed an individual re-examination of the values of his day with the hope of
creating a value system worthy of positive production within the human
condition. In Ecce Homo (IV 1), he offers the following observation, albeit given
in his usual hyperbolic fashion.
Revaluation of all values: that is my formula for an act of ultimate self- 
examination by mankind which in me has become flesh and genius. My 
lot is that I must be the first decent human being, that I know myself to be 
in opposition against the mendaciousness of millennia.1
This revaluation would come in the form of a personal discovery for each
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individual.
A more thorough analysis of Nietzsche's concept of revaluation is presented 
in the Part the Fifth, Section 1.00 of this dissertation. What is important for 
present purposes is that the overall concept of a total re-examination in terms of 
a revaluation serves as the basis for my revaluation of contemporary education. 
It is intended to be a statement of offering, as was Nietzsche's case: but still, it 
presents a systematized alternative, if you will, for a more effective approach to 
education. Hence, the enigmatic term, revaluation, is used. Its intention is to call 
attention to the bankruptcy of those values in education which have resulted in 
the confusion and misdirection which has been the benchmark of education in 
America during the past four decades.
In this spirit, Part the Fifth of this dissertation presents seven Corollaries for 
a Revaluation of Contemporary Education outlined here, and briefly surveyed in 
Section 6.00 of this Part.
Corollaries for a Revaluation of Contemporary Education
1. While the learner is to be the focus of education, the object of 
education is a quest of taking the learner beyond the confines of 
collective and individual mediocrity.
2. The educator is a guide for the attainment of the higher state of 
being in the learner.
3. Education is analogous to a Rorschach Ink Blot interpretation.
4. Learning is an internal process; teaching is an external process.
5. Values are inherently interwoven into the fabric of education, but 
are socially motivated and, as such, are trapped.
6. The structure of education must serve the development of the 
learner, not the preservation of the state. It must provide for a 
curriculum which fosters the development of creativity and critical
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thinking.
7. Elitism does not imply privilege. It demands service.
3.00 Presentation of Educational Research 
In order to establish the fact of weaknesses inherent in contemporary 
education it is not wise to depend upon hearsay or negative predisposition, but, 
rather, a review of literature substantiating should be presented. This was cited 
in Part the Second, Section 2.00, above. In short, recent findings were analyzed 
and quoted so that a justified picture of where education is perceived to be today 
can be realized. Such researchers and scholars as Barber, Kozol, Joyce, Shaw, 
Perkins, Johnson and Johnson, Coker and White, and Sarason have isolated some 
of the instances, causes, and purported remedies to the circumstances of 
contemporary education. Their works have been crucial in the evolution of this 
dissertation.
4.00 Approaches to Researching Nietzsche's Work 
Obviously, the most important research for this dissertation is a complete 
analysis of the views Nietzsche held on the philosophy of education. The specific 
works dealt with are cited in Part the Second, Section 3.00. Briefly, however, 
analyses of Nietzsche's educational concepts as found in Beyond Good and Evil, 
Untimely Meditations, Twilight of the Idols, The Will to Power, and Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra are presented. Another work, a series of lectures entitled "On the
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Future of Our Educational Institutions," immensely adds to the corpus of 
Nietzsche's educational philosophy.
One fact which cannot go untouched is the misrepresentation of Nietzsche 
as being anti-Semitic. Here, I have relied upon such Nietzschean scholars as 
Kaufmann, Hollingdale, Morgan, Danto, and Schacht to repudiate these inept 
claims. Under normal circumstances, Nietzsche would be treated as any other 
legitimate philosopher, but, owing to the sad fact of the bastardization of his 
works for political or other personal gains, such a refutation had to be presented.
In analyzing Nietzsche's educational philosophy per se, I turn to Cooper, 
Sharp, Murphy, and Simons to cite a few. What is consistent in all of their works 
is that Nietzsche presents a clear connection between the necessity of education 
in the total development of his philosophy. It is not possible to extract this part 
of his conceptual presentations from the rest of his work.
W ithin the context of Nietzsche's complete system the dissertation 
addresses his perspectivist epistemology as a foundation to substantiate his views 
of education. It is dealt with in Part the Fourth, Section 3.00 below.
5.00 A Synthesis of Nietzsche and Contemporary Education 
Once the research of education in contemporary America and the research 
on Nietzsche's concepts of education are presented, a synthesis, if you will, of this 
research is ventured. This venture takes the form of establishing the parallels 
between Nietzsche's nineteenth century Germany and contemporary America. The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
facts of state control of education, of technology serving as the justification for 
training as opposed to educating, and the lack of a comprehensive curriculum 
which fosters creativity and critical thinking are presented and analyzed. The 
similarities which exist between these two cultures separated by almost a century 
provides the justification for using Nietzschean pedagogy as a legitimate 
consideration in establishing the revaluation of contemporary educational 
institutions.
6.00 Application
The final Part of this dissertation presents seven Corollaries for a Revaluation 
of Contemporary Education. Those Corollaries have been presented in Part the First, 
Section 5.03 and in this Part, Section 2.00 and are briefly surveyed here.
Corollary 1: While the learner is to be the focus of education, the object of education is
a quest of taking the learner beyond the confines of collective and 
individual mediocrity.
Education is to be the vehicle which can carry the student to a level which
he thought impossible. The learner must be made to realize the full potential
which he can gain by participating in concepts of creativity and critical thinking.
Education must never accept anything but the most concerted effort on the part
of the learner. At the same time, education is not to be student-centered, for in
so doing it loses its universal appeal and its timeless nature.
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Corollary 2: The educator is a guide for the attainment of the higher state of being in 
the learner.
An educator, in the Nietzschean sense, must be a mentor, even a taunter 
who inspires a learner to seek a higher level of personal effort and achievement. 
It is the educator who, of his own accord, must have reached that higher state of 
being and m ust lead the learner to that level.
Corollary 3: Education is analogous to a Rorschach Ink Blot interpretation.
A Rorschach Ink Blot interpretation may or may not have conclusive 
validity; however, it serves to make the point of the subjectivity of education. 
Just as the interpretation of what the ink blot represents is solely within the realm 
of the observer, so education is subject to the interpretation of it by the student. 
This is not to say that education does not have a more universal and timeless 
nature but, just as all concede that the ink blot is there, so we all concede that 
education is there. It is just that what is seen, or experienced is entirely within 
the confines of the individual student.
Corollary 4: Learning is an internal process; teaching is an external process.
While this may not rank with the most profound of comments on the 
nature of epistemology or of education, it serves a very utilitarian purpose. It 
forces us to keep in mind the nature of pedagogy, and, in this role, supports the 
first three Corollaries. So long as we remember the nature of the learning-teaching 
process, it is easier to assist, lead, and guide the student in his quest to gain
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Corollary 5: Values are inherently interwoven into the fabric of education, but are
socially motivated and, as such, are trapped.
The fact that without a society there would be little need for any values 
outside of those which enhanced personal gain is a given fact in moral 
philosophy. The society of which an educational institution is a part has its own 
set of value standards and, in turn, the educational institution must, of necessity, 
promote those values in order to fulfill its function which is defined by the 
society, viz-a-vis, the state. In this sense, values are trapped by that state; thus, 
education becomes trapped and cannot bring the student to the higher state of 
being.
Corollary 6: The structure of education must serve the development of the learner, not 
the preservation of the state. It must provide for a curriculum which 
fosters the development of creativity and critical thinking.
Contrary to what we have learned from such philosophers as John Dewey, 
education m ust not be the tool of the state. Should this become the case, the 
entire process of education becomes subject to the control of those who may be 
in power at the time. Education must keep in m ind that it is the development of 
the learner which preserves it, not the preservation of the state which promotes 
it. Without a system which is designed independently from the state, education 
can never develop the higher state of being in the individual learner.
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Corollary 7: Elitism does not imply privilege; it demands service.
The discussion up to this point has emphasized the development of a higher 
state of being within the student. For many, this notion smacks of elitism—and 
that is exactly what it is. However, in this sense elitism has as its aim the 
beneficial assistance to the entirety of the human condition. It is to serve as an 
example of the attainment of that higher state of being, in which individuals are 
more personally accountable, more aware, more willing to contribute, more able 
to apprehend a sense of self-control, and more obliged to serve the human 
condition.
7.00 Transitional Summation 
In the final analysis, it will be the development of that higher state of being 
through the enhancement of creativity and critical thinking which allows the 
hum an condition to realize its fullest potential, its highest hopes, its most lofty of 
aspirations. It will be Nietzschean pedagogy which will allow a revaluation of 
Contemporary Education resulting in the higher state of being. With this in mind, 
Part the Fourth: Nietzschean Pedagogy and Part the Fifth: The Revaluation take 
a departure from the traditional dissertation presentation. Usually the fourth 
chapter of a dissertation presents the quantitative data as evidence of the research 
while the fifth chapter presents the conclusions of the research. As a consequence 
of my research and its qualitative nature, as was presented in Section 1.00, 
Methodology, of this Part, the final two Parts, as chapters, respectively present the
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qualitative data from the various sources researched, and my Corollaries for a 
revaluation of education as conclusion. As has been presented throughout this 
Part, the entire enterprise of this dissertation focuses on a methodology which 
depends upon qualitative approaches and is mete-educational and philosophical 
in nature. It would be inconsistent and rather inappropriate to present it in any 
other fashion. Nevertheless, throughout the final two Parts, as chapters, a 
consistent methodology and presentation are established and maintained, so that 
considerations of Nietzsche's work in the field of the philosophy of education can 
be presented in light of its essential meaning and of its importance to the field of 
education as pedagogy.
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Endnotes: Part the Third
1. Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. 
Hollingdale, (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), TV - 1.
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Part the Fourth: Nietzschean Pedaeoev
We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge-and with good 
reason. We have never sought ourselves-how could it happen that we 
should ever find ourselves? It has rightly been said: "Where your 
treasure is, there will your heart be also"; our treasure is where the 
beehives of our knowledge are.
-O n  the Genealogy of Morals, Preface
1.00 Nietzsche's Observations on Education 
The natures of philosophy and education have characteristically avoided 
each other, particularly in contemporary contexts. Education has seemed to be 
preoccupied with the development of some process, some system, some method 
to impart knowledge to the learner. On the other hand, philosophy has been 
viewed as some examination adjunct to, if not in opposition to, the enterprise of 
education. Parenthetically, perhaps this predicament is due to the proclivities of 
philosophers whose concern has been primarily with their esoteric inquiries, and 
to professional educators whose concern has been more with method than with 
theory. To be sure, there have been "philosophies of education," but, in the final 
analysis, these have been merely apologetics for some definitive, dogmatic 
approach to a given discipline or to a given institution, be it social, political, or 
economic. This approach to education has relegated it to the disposal of the state, 
with all its intrigues and sinister ulterior motives. Thus, the two as disciplines 
have typically been seen as distant cousins, at best, in the enterprises of the
66
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hum an condition.
The reality, however, is that all philosophy began with the existential 
process of teaching, or pedagogy. Socrates and Plato without exception conceived 
of themselves as teachers. Aristotle is projected by many as the greatest teacher 
of all time, and was, in fact the personal tutor of Alexander the Great. For those 
of the Christian tradition, Jesus Christ was the most prolific teacher in history, as 
was Buddha for his followers. Such notable figures in the history of the human 
condition have all been recognized as "philosophers" or religious teachers, and 
Christ himself was referred to in the Judaic tradition as rabbi, or teacher. All 
philosophy, nevertheless, is preoccupied with the process of inquiry, not with any 
specific preconceived notion of the end result, but, rather, with the development 
of some feasible fashion by which to understand, comprehend, assimilate, and 
appreciate the exigencies of the human condition. The aim of this approach has 
been to establish a suitable blueprint, if you will, which allows the learner to find 
his way as an independent agent. In short, philosophy is preoccupied with 
understanding life as the human condition, for that is the only perspective we can 
ultimately apprehend. All disciplines in the field of philosophy point to this, in 
spite of our philosophical specialists who narrow their fields to logic, 
metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics, epistemology, or the history of philosophy. Each 
of those fields contributes to understanding life as the human condition, albeit in 
somewhat esoteric fashions. Logic organizes and clarifies our arguments and 
justifications. Metaphysics offers a rationale for ventures in the human condition
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which are not empirically verifiable. Aesthetics gives us a sense of appreciation 
for those things intended to add to the joys of the human condition. Ethics allows 
us to systematize behaviors and values which produce goodness and constructive 
approaches. Epistemology presents justification for that which we claim to know. 
And this history of philosophy presents us with a chronology of those philosophic 
and cognitive discoveries we have made to perpetuate the continuum of inquiry 
in the human condition. Inasmuch as education is concerned with imparting 
knowledge about the human condition, then it properly belongs within the realm 
of philosophy, since philosophy is concerned with the apprehension of the 
meaning, the direction, the significance, and the completeness of the human 
condition. In so analyzing these two ventures of the human condition, it is 
apparent that philosophy enjoys a preeminent position in the hierarchy of 
discovery, if you will, in the human condition.
It is in this climate which we find the works of Nietzsche, the cryptic, 
aphoristic, often irascible curmudgeon of his time, who was less concerned with 
his methods of approach than he was with spurring those of his world who 
would listen to become more than their self-limiting notions were willing to 
permit. And although he never delineated an identifiable system of educational 
philosophy, it is obvious that, owing to his understandings of the obligations of 
philosophers, he was deeply concerned with the development of an approach to 
education which was imbued with the principles of inquiry inherent in 
philosophy. As such, the philosophy of life, for him, was identical with the
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philosophy of education. Timothy M urphy in his doctoral dissertation, Teaching 
the Dance: Nietzsche as Educator, has systematically established Nietzsche as a 
legitimate philosopher of education since Nietzsche proposes that the function of 
philosophy is to teach one how to live, and education is the process of imparting 
that knowledge.
In looking at the reasons for which commentators have accounted 
Nietzsche a philosopher, it has been seen that no philosophical interpreter 
has account [sic] Nietzsche as a philosopher because of his concern with 
education. Rather, they have focused on his metaphysical, analytic, and 
moral aspects. Moreover, a review of the history of the philosophy of 
education has revealed that Nietzsche has been given only the most 
summary of treatments there. However, looking at a wide range of his 
own remarks and styles [al] though Nietzsche does contribute to 
metaphysical and linguistic concerns, these concerns do not exhaust his 
notion of philosophy. Rather, since he took philosophy as tied to the art 
of human living, philosophy properly so called has an irreducible 
educative quality to it. A genuine philosopher translates his metaphysical, 
epistemological, and axiological visions back into the realm of actual life. 
And it is there that the issue of "truth" or "falsity" is decided. Ignorance 
of how to live spawns philosophy, and Nietzsche would have philosophy 
educate in living creatively. Nietzsche earns the rank of philosopher of 
education because he clearly reflected on and discussed alternatives to the 
institutions, process and product of contemporary education. To him, 
philosophy meant the educative enterprise in the widest sense. One could 
even claim that Nietzsche's whole corpus are his reflections on education 
since they discuss the lived goal that Nietzsche proposed for man.1
Such an identification of Nietzsche as a philosopher of education has been
necessary because of the nature of his works but, and even more so, because of
the battering he has taken in the past for reasons alluded to Part the First, Section
5.01. The import here is that Nietzsche's works legitimately establish him as a
viable philosopher of education not because he definitively evolved a system of
education, but because he recognized that the processes of philosophical
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investigation provide, in actuality, the only genuine educative method as 
pedagogy.
1.01 Philosophy and Education are the Same Activity
For Nietzsche, then, philosophy and education become one and the same
enterprise in the human condition with education as process becoming the vehicle
for the evolution of the development of a system for the resolution of not only
surviving, but also of enjoying our individual plights. This interwoven tapestry
of philosophy and education for Nietzsche becomes more apparent when we
analyze some of his pronouncements in "Schopenhauer as Educator." Ann
Margaret Sharp has quoted Nietzsche from "Schopenhauer" when he declared,
"Your educators can be only your liberators,"2 and has used this as the title of her
examination of Nietzschean pedagogy, "The Teacher as Liberator: A Nietzschean
View." This is an extensive article developed from her dissertation of the same
title. In her introduction, she clearly establishes this connection between
philosophy and education in the Nietzschean tradition and defines the concept
of the "philosophy of education" to which Nietzsche firmly subscribes.
For Friedrich Nietzsche, educational philosophy and philosophy of life 
were one. If philosophy is unrelated to life, it is irrelevant and harmful. 
To the extent that it does not help one in his everyday life to create 
meaning, it can be suffocating. The aim of education and life is liberation, 
the endless process of self-overcoming, and the educator the means by 
which the student can become himself. Educational philosophy therefore 
must concern itself with the freedom of the individual student.3
Philosophy, then, becomes the ultimate end of education for Nietzsche. To make
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attempts to differentiate them as two separate disciplines is futile and myopic.
M urphy concurs in this observation, but his observation is more along the 
lines of philosophy teaching the concepts of the human condition as approaches 
to life, or a "philosophy of life".
Since philosophy is so intimately tied to the immediate concern of 
life, Nietzsche is very much concerned with the educative powers of 
philosophy. Since education is, patently, tied to the art or mode of human 
living, it follows that Nietzsche cannot distinguish between philosophy and 
education at their highest levels, for the aims of both are identical. That 
Nietzsche claims his writings are for the few, and that genuine education 
likewise belongs to the elite is no objection to this claim, for all individuals 
must, to some extent, be philosophical in wondering about the conduct of 
their lives. A great philosopher and a great educator, then, would be the 
same in that they offer insight, instruction, and examples of responses to 
the existential ignorance that spawns philosophy in the first place.
The test for the value of education in Nietzsche, as for philosophy, 
is life, not rational systematizing power. This, furthermore, would seem 
to be the reason Nietzsche does not do in his own writings what 
commentators have done with them, namely add them up into a 
philosophy. If there are apparent contradictions at the level of rational 
interpretation, it might well be that at the level of life, one does not 
experience these as inconsistencies.4
It is here that there is the obvious convergence of philosophy, the philosopher, 
and education. For Nietzsche there is no distinction in the finest of senses. If one 
is a philosopher, one is a teacher; if one is educating, one is being a philosopher. 
As this dissertation later develops, the concept of the importance of this non­
distinction between philosophy and education becomes clearer. For the moment, 
however, suffice it to say that education is a function of philosophy, and teaching 
is a function of the philosopher.
M urphy points out that in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the first words out of 
Zarathustra's mouth are "I teach,"5 which also is the introductory quotation of this
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dissertation. The significance is that it emphasizes the interdependence of
education, the educator, philosophy, and the philosopher. Murphy further
amplifies this point.
If Thus Spoke Zarathustra is Nietzsche's most important work, there is no 
denying that its form is a master speaking to disciples, and that the master 
is searching out kindred souls among them for the tasks that he would 
im part to them (Namely the tasks that they would initiate). In this sense, 
then, education and philosophy meet, for philosophy aims at teaching, and 
genuine education cannot take place without philosophical labor.6
That Nietzsche devised no system for the philosophy of education, then, would
seem to be an element which he believed to be superfluous since philosophy and
education, in his view, were the same activity in the human condition.
1.02 The Philosopher is the Educator
The purpose of education, then, is common with the purpose of philosophy 
—that is to say, to instruct the learner in the ways and means by which to conduct 
himself in the human condition. Still, there must be some criteria for the guide 
in the journey of this instruction—the educator. Yes, the philosopher is the 
educator, and vice-versa but, in order to be able to attain such a position in the 
structure of the human condition, there m ust be some substantive measures by 
which we determine the tasks and the legitimacy of such a one. Although 
Nietzsche himself would discount the concept of specific delineations, since the 
philosopher as educator would emerge as a product of his own being, he, 
nevertheless, offers some descriptions of this philosopher as educator, or educator 
as philosopher in a number of significant works.
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Inasmuch as it is the primary goal of education and, thus, the primary task
of the educator to develop the ubermensch, the educator, or pedagogist, must be
at that level of development, the higher state of being, in order to impart it. The
higher state of the human condition is that state arrived at through the constant
process of self-overcoming, of self-realization, of self-attainment. There is a very
significant passage in The Will to Power which identifies the qualities a
Nietzschean educator as philosopher must possess.
Assuming one thinks of a philosopher as a great educator, powerful 
enough to draw up to his lonely height a long chain of generations, then 
one must also grant him the uncanny privileges of the great educator. An 
educator never says what he himself thinks, but always only what he 
thinks of a thing in relation to the requirement of those he educates. He 
must not be detected in this dissimulation; it is part of his mastery that one 
believes in his honesty. He must be capable of employing every means of 
discipline: some he can drive toward the heights only with the whips of 
scorn; others, who are slugglish [sic], irresolute, cowardly, vain, perhaps 
only with exaggerated praise. Such an educator is beyond good and evil; 
but no one m ust know it.7
This is perhaps the most definitive of Nietzschean allusions to the educator's
qualities, and it clearly states the great self-discipline a philosopher as educator
m ust master. How can this philosopher as educator hope to inspire or to
motivate learners to a level which he has not attained prior to any educative
activity? Such a level of educative experience would be unauthentic in the
human condition were the educator as pedagogist not to have arrived at this
higher state of the human condition prior to imparting his pedagogy.
In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche gives us another indication of the duties
of the great pedagogist in terms of purpose. Recognizing that the primary task
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
74
of the pedagogist is to bring the learner to the higher state of the human condition,
as ubermensch, Nietzsche here points to the desired end of the educative process.
To teach man the future of man as his will, as dependent on a human will, 
and to prepare great ventures and over-all attempts of discipline and 
cultivation by way of putting an end to that gruesome dominion of 
nonsense and accident that has so far been called "history"--the nonsense 
of the "greatest number" is merely its ultimate form: at some time new 
types of philosophers and commanders will be necessary for that, and 
whatever has existed on earth of concealed, terrible, and benevolent spirits, 
will look pale and dwarfed by comparison. It is the image of such leaders 
that we envisage: may I say this out loud, you free spirits? The conditions 
that one would have partly to create and partly to exploit for their genesis; 
the probable ways and tests that would enable a soul to grow to such a 
height and force that it would feel the compulsion for such tasks; a 
revaluation of values under whose new pressure and hammer a conscience 
would be steeled, a heart turned to bronze, in order to endure the weight 
of such responsibility; on the other hand, the necessity of such leaders, the 
frightening danger that they might fail to appear or that they might turn 
out badly or degenerate—these are our real worries and gloom—do you 
know that, you free spirits?-these are the heavy distant thoughts and 
storms that pass over the sky of our life.8
It is through education, then, that leaders in the human condition are to be
developed. Although this may indicate a privileged elite, that elitism is
emphatically not to be based on privilege, but rather on service. Nevertheless, it
is Nietzsche's goal that pedagogists bring about the emergence of a new being,
and, as such, it is pivotal in the process that the pedagogist already has emerged
at this higher state of the human condition.
In Nietzsche's eyes, the one, true educator was Schopenhauer, and in his
tribute, "Schopenhauer as Educator", he further identifies those qualities and
attributes which the pedagogist must exhibit. This is also the source of Sharp's
treatise analyzing the educator as "liberator".
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Your true educators and formative teachers reveal to you what the true 
basic material of your being is, something in itself ineducable and in any 
case difficult of access, bound and paralysed: your educators can only be 
your liberators. And that is the secret of all culture: it does not provide 
artificial limbs, wax noses or spectacles—that which can provide these 
things is, rather, only sham education.9
This is obviously consistent with his directives for the evolution of the human
condition to the higher state, the development within the learner of a sense of self-
awareness, self-revelation, self-discovery, self-reliance, in service to the rest of the
hum an condition. He further describes this evolution—and here it is important
to note that "evolution" of this type is my term, and implies no Darwinian or
biological metamorphosis, but, rather, a cognitive growth and enhancement-in
terms which further outlines the qualities of the great pedagogist.
That educating philosopher of whom I dreamed would, I came to think, 
not only discover the central force, he would also know how to prevent its 
acting destructively on the other forces: his educational task would, it 
seemed to me, be to mould the whole man into a living planetary system 
and to understand its higher laws of motion.10
The "central force" to which he refers is an allusion to the emerging self of the
learner, which is to be directed in constructive activity for the benefit of the
human condition, for it is just as true, which Nietzsche clearly understands here,
that it can be deployed in a negative an d /o r destructive fashion. The skill, the
art of the pedagogist is to tap into that reservoir of cognitive and creative wealth
within the individual learner and to direct it in beneficent, positive pursuits.
The Nietzschean pedagogist also has developed a kind of self-gravity which
manifests itself in pure honesty. His descriptions here are descriptions of
Schopenhauer, to be certain; however, they are also very central identifying
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qualities which Nietzsche would have all pedagogists possess.
He is honest because he speaks and writes to himself and for himself, 
cheerful because he has conquered the hardest task by thinking, and 
steadfast because he has to be. His strength rises straight and calmly 
upwards like a flame when there is no wind, imperturbably, without 
restless wavering. He finds his way every time before we have so much 
as noticed that he has been seeking it; as though compelled by a law of 
gravity he runs on ahead, so firm and agile, so inevitably. And whoever 
has felt what it means to discover among our tragelaphine men of today 
a whole, complete, self-moving, unconstrained and unhampered natural 
being will understand my joy and amazement when I discovered 
Schopenhauer. I sensed that in him I had discovered that educator and 
philosopher I had sought for so long.11
While describing Schopenhauer in this passage, Nietzsche also offers the formula
for his ideal pedagogist.
Another passage from "Schopenhauer as Educator" more succinctly isolates
those qualities characteristic of Nietzschean pedagogy. Again, the specific
description is of Schopenhauer, but it is also the delineation of the effective
pedagogist. This passage offers an approach which Nietzsche feels will assist in
appreciating the philosophy of Schopenhauer, but, at the same time, it obviously
denotes the definitive model for a Nietzschean pedagogist.
Individually, by the individual only for himself, so as to gain insight into 
his own want and misery, into his own limitedness, so as then to learn the 
nature of his antidotes and consolations: namely, sacrifice of the ego, 
submission to the noblest ends, above all to those of justice and 
compassion. He teaches us to distinguish between those things that really 
promote human happiness and those that only appear to do so: how 
neither riches nor honours nor erudition can lift the individual out of the 
profound depression he feels at the valuelessness of his existence, and how 
the striving after these valued things acquires meaning only through an 
exalted and transfiguring overall goal: to acquire power so as to aid the 
evolution of the physis and to be for a while the corrector of its follies and 
ineptitudes. At first only for yourself, to be sure; but through yourself in 
the end for everyone. It is true that this is a striving which by its nature
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leads towards resignation: for what and how much is amenable to any 
kind of improvement at all, in the individual or in the generality.12
It is clear that Nietzsche would demand much of the learner, but what is clearer
is the great expectations of the pedagogist who through a life of se//-overcoming
emerges not only as a guide to the learner, but also as an example of what can
be achieved in this process.
1.03 Tne Purpose of Education is to Create the Ubermensch
In all of his writings on the purpose of education, Nietzsche demands that
its end be the creation of that creative, yet analytic being who can be self-
sufficient, who can deny the mediocrity of the herd, and who can find that sense
of, in my terms, self-gravity. This is the central purpose of education for
Nietzsche. We see the basis of this, again, in "Schopenhauer as Educator" when
Nietzsche speaks of personal accountability, or as Cooper terms it, authenticity.
We are responsible to ourselves for our own existence; consequently we 
want to be the true helmsmen of this existence and refuse to allow our 
existence to resemble a mindless act of chance. One has to take a 
somewhat bold and dangerous line with this existence.13
It is education, through the guidance of the pedagogist, which will permit and
evolve those types of beings who can lead, but not in an imperial sense; rather,
they lead in a courageous crusade against the mundane, the mediocre, the
complacent form of existence which results in nihilism.
The task of the pedagogist, and hence of education, is a kind of "liberation,"
as Sharp points out in her explication of "Schopenhauer as Educator." This
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liberation is not political, necessarily, but is cognitive and experiential, even
sociological in essence. It is a liberation of the true self to a newer form of
existence, the higher state, of the human condition.
It is Nietzsche's view that it is the main task of the educator to reach out 
for the student and to become his agent of liberation, aware that the end 
result will inevitably be the creation of men who will come into conflict 
with the prevailing norms of society and who will begin the process of the 
creation of new values for mankind. In order for this value-creator to 
become a reality, educators must will his existence consciously and then set 
about systematically to form him.14
While it is interesting to note Sharp's allusion to the creation of new values,
the central concept of revaluation in this dissertation, the point, nevertheless, is
that the thrust of any educational venture or institution is the production of a
new kind of being, a new creation. The identifying characteristics of this kind of
being far exceed the normal expectations of a "crusader against nihilism," which
might be the perceived notion. It is much more than that, as Nietzsche outlines
in the following passage from The Will to Power. This kind of new being will be,
in Nietzsche's lexicon, "men of destinies" who are self-reliant, but, at the same
time, understand both the present state of the human condition and the vision of
the kind of higher state which will both liberate and lead.
Men who are destinies, who by bearing themselves bear destinies, the 
whole species of heroic bearers of burdens: oh how they would like to rest 
from themselves for once! how they thirst for strong hearts and necks, so 
as to be free from what oppresses them at least for a few hours! And how 
vainly they thirst!—They wait; they look at everything that passes: no one 
approaches them with as much as a thousandth part of their suffering and 
passion, no one divines in what way they are waiting—at length, at length 
they learn their first piece of worldly prudence—not to wait any more; and 
soon another one: to be genial, to be modest, from now on to endure 
everyone, to endure everything—in short, to endure even a littler more than
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they have endured so far.15 
It is this type of being which Nietzsche would have emerge from the educative 
process—beings of destiny.
This development of the higher state of being must come from a system 
which is most demanding, most rigid, and most competitive. Without this 
approach we would forever be the captives of the nihilistic expectations of the 
herd. Thus, the institutions which produce this type of being must also be 
demanding.
The most desirable thing is still under all circumstances a hard discipline 
at the proper time, i.e., at that age at which it still makes one proud to see 
that much is demanded of one. For this is what distinguishes the hard 
school as a good school from all others: that much is demanded; and 
sternly demanded; that the good, even the exceptional, is demanded as the 
norm; that praise is rare, that indulgence is nonexistent; that blame is 
apportioned sharply, objectively, without regard for talent or antecedents.16
This, then, is the purpose of education—to bring about the development of the
higher state of being within the human condition, to produce creative, analytic
beings who can lead by example, and who, by their very natures, can effect the
revaluation of all values.
2.00 Pedagogy of the Ubermensch 
In the process of Nietzschean pedagogy, obviously there are some 
significant elements which have direct bearing upon the evolution of the 
ubermensch through a satisfactory system of education. Again, I have preferred 
to use the phrase higher state of the human condition for purposes of avoiding the
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traditional negative connotations associated with the term ubermensch. Still, there
is a clearly delineated corridor for teaching with the higher state of the human
condition in mind. Nietzsche called for four fundamental approaches in his
pedagogy of the ubermensch: love of the educator as pedagogist, pedagogy as a
contest or competition, the application of his doctrine of amor fati, and the
development of the whole person. Each of these rudimentary principles involves
the establishment of a pedagogy specific enough to focus upon the learner, yet
expansive enough to bring about the higher state of the human condition within
the learner. I say these principles are "called for" by Nietzsche, but in reality he
offered these in his usual cryptic fashion in segments throughout the entire
corpus of his work. This is important to keep in mind since he was more
concerned with the use of education as a process intrinsically interwoven with
philosophy. M urphy amplifies this position in establishing Nietzsche as a
legitimate philosopher of education.
Nietzsche's entire corpus of works centers around, of course, the 
relationship between life and values. And in that respect his concerns 
would be those of a grand teacher (and this is not necessarily equatable 
with a grand scholar) who attempts, through his criticism and example, to 
instruct humanity in a proper way to live. It would seem, moreover, that 
his very notion of philosophy cannot be understood but as being educative 
in nature.17
When we look at such works as Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "Schopenhauer as 
Educator," and "On the Future of Our Educational Institutions," we can see his 
philosophical disposition being applied to pedagogy. However, in his sense 
pedagogy is more a quality of being than an approach; it is more an aspect of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
81
ubermensch personality than a dictum of methods to which the educator must 
subscribe. As such, there is a "pedagogy of the ubermensch," which is both worthy 
of examination and explication.
It is important here to make a clarification of the concept of the ubermensch, 
as was alluded to in Part the First, Section 4.00. Nietzsche's sociological concern, 
and hence his moral concern, had to do with the nihilism which he found rampant 
in his nineteenth century Germany. It had eaten away at the moral fiber of his 
country and he was seeking a doctrine which would oppose such a deterioration 
of the hum an condition. This nihilism was the result of what Nietzsche had 
observed in the pronouncement God is dead! It was not a theological dictum: 
rather, it was his sociological assessment of his time. Without belief in God, in 
a very real and active sense, the human condition was left to its own devices. 
Thus, humanity has become disoriented morally, preoccupied with material 
acquisition and with the fulfillment of gratification of the self for the self. The 
void created by the absence of God had become so great that values had become 
based on personal power and personal gain. Those in positions of power, be it 
financial or political, were the dictators of value, of purpose, and of social 
institutions. The only direction for Nietzsche was to find a manner in which one 
could emerge beyond the extant environment; thus, such a one would be above the 
morality and mentality of the herd. His concern focused upon the evolution of 
the ubermensch, or "overman." The implications of such a term have been 
incendiary largely due to the association of concepts with the Nazi movement, but
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had Nietzsche been alive he would have soundly repudiated their applications of
his philosophy, as explained in Part the First, Section 5.01. He was emphatically
not seeking a super-race, but an improved, more aware, more responsible, more
morally advanced, more creative, more sensitive, more analytic being. He speaks
of such a being in The Antichrist when he defines "spiritual men." Here he offers
the dimensions of his ubermensch.
The most spiritual men, as the strongest, find their happiness where others 
would find their destruction: in the labyrinth, in hardness against 
themselves and others, in experiments; their joy is self-conquest; asceticism 
becomes in them nature, need, and instinct. Difficult tasks are a privilege 
to them; to play with burdens which crush others, a recreation. 
Knowledge~a form of asceticism. They are the most venerable kind of 
man; that does not preclude their being the most cheerful and the kindliest. 
They rule not because they want to but because they are; they are not free 
to be second.18
It implies an obligation to service, not a privilege to excess.
Dr. Morton Teicher, Dean Emeritus of the School of Social Work at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, has suggested that there is an 
apparent analogous relationship between Nietzsche's ubermensch and Jews as the 
"Chosen People." In this sense, it is more of an imposed obligation to serve the rest 
of humanity through leadership in spiritual and moral values. The concept of 
imposition, though not so stated in Nietzsche is clearly there. The behavior of 
Zarathustra, his allusions to "asceticism" as a way of life, the references to 
accepting the difficulties and hardships of life, and the concept of amor fati— that 
is, embracing one's fate willingly—all point to a kind of imposition. Zarathustra 
speaks of "commanding" and its burden which reveals this kind of imposition as
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obligation.
Commanding is more difficult than obeying. And not only because the 
commander bears the burden of all who obey, and that this burden can 
easily crush him.
In all commanding there appeared to me to be an experiment and 
a risk: and the living creature always risks himself when he commands.
Yes, even when he commands himself: then also m ust he make 
amends for his commanding. He must become judge and avenger and 
victim of his own law.19
With this in mind, the concept of ubermensch allows the creation of an elite class. 
However, this entire elite is preoccupied with the task of constant self­
overcoming, of facing the struggle of life, and of promoting the highest ideals of 
the human condition. As such, it is analogous to the imposed obligation of the 
Jews as the "Chosen People."
In the final analysis, the concept of the ubermensch entails an intense 
dedication to the attainment of the higher state of the human condition through 
self-overcoming, risk taking, asceticism, the pursuit of knowledge, and the 
creation of a morality not bound by the herd. It is rather like Gulliver in his 
experiences with the Lilliputians. Their ropes were but threads to him, but 
enough threads bound him securely until he could reach an agreement with them. 
His training as a physician allowed him to see the more gentle side of the human 
condition, but his physical stature made him a serious threat. Traditionally, the 
ubermensch has been viewed as a kind of Gulliver by the Lilliputians, Nietzsche's 
herd. Like Nietzsche's ubermensch, Gulliver had to overcome some of his internal 
inequities, if we can call them such, in order to lead; for his plight in Lilliput was 
to lead merely by his being there. So it is with the concept of the ubermensch. By
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mere existence, he is called upon to lead—an imposed obligation.
It is this same kind of imposed obligation which imbues the pedagogist in 
educational pursuits with his students as learners. It pervades all that the 
pedagogist does in loving, in competing, in embracing one's fate as amor fati, and 
in the evolution of the whole person.
2.01 There Must Be Love between the Pedagogist and the Learner
One of the primary elements in the establishment of a Nietzschean 
pedagogy is understanding the relationship between the pedagogist and the 
student as learner. Sharp identifies this as a true-love relationship, even as eros. 
I believe that this takes license with Nietzsche and it should be viewed more in 
the metaphorical context which is consistent with the rest of Nietzsche's writings. 
Still, it is a crucial concept to examine since it lays the foundation for the entire 
pedagogist-learner enterprise.
In this concept of love, we find a strong sense of dedication, of selflessness, 
of sacrifice, of enduring even when the learner is reticent. This is apparent in 
"Schopenhauer as Educator" when Nietzsche addresses the concept of self- 
knowledge. It is most applicable when we see it in the context of the dedication 
of the pedagogist.
It is hard to create in anyone this condition of intrepid self-knowledge 
because it is impossible to teach love; for it is love alone that can bestow 
on the soul, not only a clear, discriminating and self-contemptuous view 
of itself, but also the desire to look beyond itself and to seek with all its 
might for a higher self as yet still concealed from it. Thus only he who has 
attached his heart to some great man is by that act consecrated to culture; the
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sign of that consecration is that one is ashamed of oneself without any 
accompanying feeling of distress, that one comes to hate one's own 
narrowness and shrivelled nature, that one has a feeling of sympathy for 
the genius who again and again drags himself up out of our dryness and 
apathy and the same feeling in anticipation for all those who are still 
struggling and evolving, with the profoundest conviction that almost 
everywhere we encounter nature pressing towards man and again and 
again failing to achieve him, yet everywhere succeeding in producing the 
most marvelous beginnings, individual traits and forms: so that the men 
we live among resemble a field over which is scattered the most precious 
fragments of sculpture where everything calls to us: come, assist, complete, 
bring together what belongs together, we have an immeasurable longing 
to become whole.20
It is here that we find the essential nature of the plight of the pedagogist in his
relationship with the learner. The struggle is to bring about in the individual
learner that higher state of the human condition, and it is only through a loving
relationship that this can be achieved.
Sharp points this out in identifying the love a pedagogist must have in
order to fulfill his obligations as a true educator.
Nietzsche's ideal teacher is a man who loves not only himself but all of 
mankind; he is characterized by an eros directed toward all of nature. 
Because his focus is always the potential freedom of students, he is a man 
of faith. He has faith in himself and in his students to endure the 
hardships of the liberation process.21
For Nietzsche, then, it is this kind of love which affirms the relationship between
the pedagogist and the learner. In so doing it creates a bond between them which
is unique to them, and is their exclusive property. It is just as if they were, in
fact, two lovers seeking to build their own, singular relationship. The result is a
kind of oasis, if you will, comprised of the parts of their individual personalities,
yet being superseded by the establishment of this oasis. They do not lose
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themselves in the oasis, they are expanded by it, enhanced by it, heightened by
it, and the intended product is the higher state of the human condition, created,
in this instance, by love. As Sharp further states,
Eros is the basis of the student-teacher relationship for Nietzsche. When 
Zarathustra comes down off the mountain, he says "I love mankind. I 
bring them a gift". The correlative of loving is giving out of gratitude for 
life itself. This eros is that which gives possibility to the student's 
continual ascent toward self-perfection.22
It is crucial that the relationship be based upon trust, just as with lovers in
any other sense. This trust comes from the first contact the student has with the
pedagogist. The first time on a campus can be intimidating enough for a young
learner, and a first lecture can be even more intimidating. It is at that moment
that the pedagogist must extend the trust, as love, to the student. Furthermore,
it must be present in every activity of the pedagogist to the extent that he gives
of himself totally to the task of developing the higher state of the human condition
within the student.
His lectures and classes, although important as a means of imparting 
knowledge, are only a corollary to his main role as lover. This role 
demands total giving of oneself. It demands men who are willing to risk 
themselves, who are open, who trust themselves and thus are not 
defensive.23
This concept of love as presented by Sharp is reminiscent of the Biblical "love 
chapter" from St. Paul's first letter to the Corinthians. It has been quoted in many 
contexts before and has had many applications, but it seems quite appropriate 
here to allude to it so that the parallels between Nietzsche's "love" for his students 
is not misunderstood and appear to be predatory in nature, or even worse.
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Love is patient and kind; love is not jealous or boastful; it is not arrogant 
or rude. Love does not insist on its own way; it is not irritable or 
resentful; it does not rejoice at wrong, but rejoices in the right. Love bears 
all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things.24
Perhaps the most applicable of this passage is the final sentence, for here it
presents the suffering a lover may be forced to endure, as the pedagogist may be
forced to endure the pains of bringing about the higher state in the student.
Consistent with the rest of Nietzsche's concepts of over-coming in the
hum an condition, there rests with the pedagogist a degree of suffering which is
indicative of the life of the ubermensch. He never lets us forget that part of the
hum an condition is the over-coming of personal loss and pain, and of not
acquiescing to it. His explication of the love to be exhibited by the pedagogist is
best presented by Zarathustra in his utterance on "Of Marriage and Children".
While its focus is on the rationality of marriage and love in that specific context,
it vividly explains the same relationship which is to exist between the pedagogist
and the learner.
But even your best love too is only a passionate impersonation and 
a painful ardour. It is a torch which should light your way to higher 
paths.
One day you shall love beyond yourselves! So first learn to love! 
For that you have had to drink the bitter cup of your love.
There is a bitterness in the cup of even the best love: thus it arouses 
longing for the Superman, thus it arouses thirst in you, the creator!25
When this love is effected, it is the genesis of the creative powers in the
hum an condition and will precipitate creativity within the learner. It could not
have been possible to produce had the relationship between the pedagogist and
the learner been established without love.
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The eros of the educator sets in motion that drive for creativity, continual 
self-renewal. The educator fertilizes the young student so that he may be 
capable of creating new ideas and moving toward self-perfection. The 
ideal is never reached but serves as a goal toward which the student 
strives. He becomes more aware of his limitations and ignorance as he 
moves closer to the ideal.26
The great benefit of having arrived at the higher state of the human condition is
the tremendous creativity which is an end result; thus, it is through this kind of
love, metaphorically erotic, that the pedagogist is able to bring the learner closer
to the attainment of it.
2.02 The Contest, as Agon, is the Foundation for Epistemic Discovery
Just as Sharp points to an attitude of love as a backdrop for the educator 
and his pedagogy, M urphy points out that one of the main tenets for a 
Nietzschean pedagogy is the recognition of competition in education as agon, the 
Greek for contest. It is reflective of a concept of methodology as we might find 
in any text on educational methods; however, its position is one of being a vehicle 
for the apprehension of knowledge. As a vehicle it provides the learner with 
experience in dealing with the contest, which is to be engaged not only with 
others, but primarily with the self, then to others, and finally with the rest of the 
cosmos.
The contest is not only an intellectual contest, but a contest of the quality 
of all life, of all meaning. The irreducible advantage of the contest is 
experience. And to the extent that the contest provides that experience, 
Nietzsche looks to it as the guiding notion of philosophy, of education, of 
life itself.27
Perhaps we may substitute the word "challenge" for contest in our contemporary
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educational systems, but that is too soft a word for Nietzsche. The challenge is
a given notion in his structure of the cognitive and spiritual development of the
human condition. Nietzsche believes that there must be a type of actual
engagement of another self, another circumstance, another idea, another struggle.
And it has a most significant place in the emergence of the higher state of being;
thus, it must be a fundamental part of the educative process.
If education is to be faithful to human beings, then the contest must be 
structured into the very process of education. The educational process, 
therefore, m ust be literally agonal, a continuing series of contests provided 
such that the student can master his existential situation and in such a way 
that he not fall victim to a devastating partialism. That said, it would be 
well to point out that Nietzsche did not locate the value of the contest in 
the result of the contest necessarily, such that if one lost, then one gained 
nothing. Rather, he located the value of the contest in the struggle on 
behalf of some cause. Accordingly, he can say that "The value of a thing 
sometimes lies not in what one attains with it, but in what one pays for it." 
[Twilight of the Idols]26
The intention is not to be antagonistic or belligerent, but to be engaged in an
activity which would bring out the best in the human condition, and thus, the
best in the development of the self. As Nietzsche puts it in Homer's Contest, "Not
to the activity of fights of annihilation but to the activity of fights which are
contests."29
So vital to the concept of education is this idea of the contest that Nietzsche
insists that it must be seen as producing positive ends.
Every talent must unfold itself in fighting: that is the command of Hellenic 
popular pedagogy, whereas modern educators dread nothing more than 
the unleashing of so-called ambition. And just as the youth were educated 
through contests, their educators were also engaged in contests with each 
other.30
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
90
The unfolding of talent is indicative of the measure of the development of the self
through the concept of the struggle with the self, with others, with life itself.
Still, the question of victory looms over this concept. Why do we worship
it as much as we do? It is an affirmation of the self, but, what is more, it allows
the clarification of our individual human quests to succeed in the apprehension
and attainment of an ideal. As such, it is a process of cognitive development.
Nietzsche is quick to point out that in this concept as an educative vehicle the
contest m ust not produce a single victor, but many, constantly emerging victors.
It is like the old game of "King of the Mountain." While one contestant may be
victorious in any particular charge or exchange, the charges are continual, endless,
and demand that each victor, no matter how elated, must be aware that the
contest is never over.
Why should no one be the best? Because then the contest would come to 
an end and the eternal source of life for the Hellenic state would be 
endangered. Originally this curious institution is not a safety valve but a 
means of stimulation: the individual who towers above the rest is 
eliminated so that the contest of forces may reawaken—an idea that is 
hostile to the "exclusiveness" of genius in the modern sense and 
presupposes that in the natural order of things there are always several 
geniuses who spur each other to action, even as they hold each other 
within the limits of measure. That is the core of the Hellenic notion of the 
contest: it abominates the rule of one and fears its dangers; its desires, as 
a protection against the genius, another genius.31
The value of such a vehicle to education and to the educative process is 
that it calls upon the most ingenious of talents through experience. When 
Nietzsche says, "Every talent must unfold itself in fighting," he alludes to the 
creativity of the individual who while engaged in the struggle must call upon
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
91
every sense he has developed thus far in the attainment of the goal, regardless of
its station in the overall scheme of things. It is an answer to the call of the
struggle, and it brings about the most creative of our individual talents. In a very
real sense, we can see this in athletic contests. Perhaps one has perfected
dribbling the basketball, but an improvement on that is dribbling between one's
legs. This is a direct response to the challenge of the contest, and it is creative.
So it is in all educative activities.
The contest functions as the form of the creative process. Even Zarathustra 
himself had to struggle long and hard with truths about the world before 
he could turn them to his advantage. So, too, would Nietzsche have the 
noble human being grapple with the world in all its aspects, such that he 
can be master and dictator of them all. For if creativity follows from the 
condition of power, then creation itself is a contest, perhaps the most 
telling and taxing of all, since the paradigmatic meaning of creation is to 
bring something out of nothing. And since Nietzsche would arrogate to 
man all the predicates of god, then is would seem that he is putting man 
in complete charge of the world, and if he cannot bring something ex 
nihilo, then he can bring something from the possibility of man.32
The true pedagogist recognizes the importance of the contest and brings
it about as an effective vehicle in his art. And it must be central to the entire
process, otherwise both pedagogist and learner become complacent and stagnant.
The nature of his instruction must be centered on the contest, for in failing 
to understand the role of the contest one fails to understand human life at 
all, or at least Nietzsche's vision that the world thrives only in struggle, 
only when it does not become complacent about its convictions.33
Celebration of this struggle, as the contest, is at the heart of creativity in the
human condition, and many of Nietzsche's aphorisms refer to it, albeit often
cloaked in some other challenge, as with his admonition, "Out of life's school of war:
What does not destroy me, makes me stronger."34 Without the contest, then,
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there can be no means by which the creative talents within each learner can be
brought forth simply because there would be no reason to do so. Even the best
of authors and poets concede that through a kind of tension arises a challenge to
tap their creative energies.
Whereas modern man fears nothing in an artist more than the emotion of 
any personal fight, the Greek knows the artist only as engaged in a personal 
fight. Precisely where modern man senses the weakness of a work of art, 
the Hellene seeks the source of its greatest strength.35
Thus, we see that the most talented of pedagogists exercises the contest in his art
to prompt creativity within the learner.
2.03 The Learner Must Be Taught to Embrace the Philosophy of Amor Fati
In the educative process there must be, of necessity, a given kind of 
tension, as with all circumstances of life. It is part and parcel of the struggle to 
which Nietzsche constantly refers, and which Murphy identifies in the contest as 
agon. Still, there are the depths of those valleys which often counteract the 
pinnacles of the mountain tops. It is in that environment which many find 
themselves hanging onto some treacherous precipice in their individual quests for 
self-attainment, self-fulfillment, self-identity. Nietzsche's response is more along 
the lines of a psychological approach when he gives us the doctrine of amor fati, 
or the love of one's individual fate. It is also, I maintain, another vital element 
in painting a picture of Nietzschean pedagogy, for without it the entire venture 
can seem meaningless, depressing, and futile.
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In "Schopenhauer as Educator," Nietzsche sets the stage for a more detailed
application of amor fati in the educative process. He acknowledges the necessity
of individuals recognizing their own uniqueness, but also the necessity of
accepting the responsibility for that uniqueness, and the acknowledgement of that
uniqueness in the human condition.
We are responsible to ourselves for our own existence; consequently, we 
want to be the true helmsman of this existence and refuse to allow our 
existence to resemble a mindless act of chance.36
But how is one to do this, to accept that responsibility with the daily onslaught
of negativism which is ram pant in the human condition and to which Nietzsche
referred to as nihilism? It is far easier to succumb to the mediocrity of the herd
and to join in their cacophony of misery. Nietzsche recognizes this plight.
But how  can we find ourselves again? How can man know himself? He 
is a thing dark and veiled; and if the hare has seven skins, man can slough 
off seventy times seven and still not be able to say: "this is really you, this 
is no longer outer shell". Moreover, it is a painful and dangerous 
undertaking thus to tunnel into oneself and to force one's way down into 
the shaft of one's being by the nearest path. A man who does it can easily 
so hurt himself that no physician can cure him.37
The danger to which Nietzsche refers is obviously psychological pain. And this
is a legitimate concern of the educative process since the learner is constantly
challenged, and not always affirmed in his attempts or in his existence. Without
affirmation, no matter what the venture—but more importantly for educative
ventures—the individual learner in the hum an condition can collapse or withdraw,
and perhaps, most tragic of all, not to be retrieved.
The purpose of "Schopenhauer as Educator" is to share with the world
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Nietzsche's admiration of a thinker whom he idolized as the summum bonum of 
individual triumph over the negativism, as nihilism, of the herd. Concurrent with 
this purpose is the delineation of a pedagogical approach for the educator, as well 
as a learning approach for the student. He bids us to find our own selves 
through a systematic program of self-discovery, self-examination, self-assertion, 
and to make that appeal to a higher set of values than is extant in the human 
condition.
For your true nature lies, not concealed deep within you, but 
immeasurably high above you, or at least above that which you usually 
take yourself to be.38
This appeal to a higher system of values, will bring with it a rejection of the herd
mentality, the herd morality.
When the great thinker despises mankind, he despises its laziness: for it is 
on account of their laziness that men seem like factory products, things of 
no consequence and unworthy to be associated with or instructed. The 
man who does not wish to belong to the mass needs only to cease taking 
himself easily; let him follow his conscience, which calls to him: "Be 
yourself! All you are now doing, thinking, desiring, is not you yourself."39
From this point he admonishes us to make the appeal to that higher set of values.
Along this same line, a quotation which is inscribed over the entrance to
the cadet barracks at The Virginia Military Institute is most applicable. It is from
the great Confederate general, Thomas "Stonewall Jackson, himself a philosophy
professor at VMI before the Civil War. It states simply, "You are what you
resolve to be." Ironically, Nietzsche was but in his teens when Jackson uttered
these words. Still, it embodies that to which Nietzsche is referring.
Nevertheless, we are left with the task of determining exactly what is an
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appropriate approach in order to achieve this level of self-development, this level 
of self-overcoming. The problem lies in a psychological self-discipline which 
allows the individual to balance the negativism and nihilism which he faces, and 
yet still survive in a hostile, when not apathetic, human condition. This solution 
lies in the dictum of amor fati, presented in the essay "Why I Am So Clever" from 
Ecce Homo.
My formula for greatness in men is amor fati: that one should not wish 
things to be otherwise, not before and not after, in the whole of eternity.40
That may all be well and good to face the windblasts of our individual fates
undaunted; yet, it requires a very well-defined internal discipline to achieve.
Granted it is an "affirmation" of not only the self, but additionally, it is a cheerful
acceptance of the position in which the self finds itself within the human
condition, as well.
Danto in Nietzsche As Philosopher offers an explication of this doctrine of 
loving one's fate.
For the attitude he felt he could and we should adopt, he provided the 
formula of Amor Fati-loving one's fate, accepting, without palliative or 
protection, the results of a most thoroughgoing critique of philosophical 
and scientific ideas, seen as fictions, the products of some human need for 
security; and then endeavoring to live in a world impervious to these 
needs, to say Yes to the cosmic insignificance, not only of oneself and of 
human beings generally but also of life and nature as a whole.41
It requires a different attitude than that to which we have become accustomed;
a dauntless attitude imbued with self-affirmation and a sense of self-gravity. The
application is clear for the pedagogist, as well as for the learner—open the
universe within by receiving the universe without, with a sense of alacrity.
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At the same time this doctrine calls for embracing self-fate, it is also a kind
of imposition of the self onto the remainder of the human condition, even the
universe. Kaufmann makes us mindful of this fact.
The projection of one's feeling toward oneself upon a cosmic scale may 
seem to hinge on a metaphysical premise, but it can be defended 
empirically. That I am here, now, doing this-that depends on an awe­
inspiring series of antecedent events, on millions of seemingly accidental 
moves and decisions, both by myself and many others whose moves and 
decisions in turn depended on yet other people. And our very existence, 
our being as we are, required that our parents had to choose each other, 
not anyone else, and beget us at the precise moment when we were 
actually begotten; and the same consideration applies to their parents, and 
to all our ancestors, going back indefinitely. Thus any affirmation of the 
present moment points far beyond the present -- and it is a significant 
psychological corollary, on which Nietzsche frequently insists, that those 
who are dissatisfied with themselves usually project their dissatisfaction 
upon the world.42
We have accepted the responsibility of rejecting nihilism. We are faced with the
world as it is, and we m ust adopt a self-affirming attitude merely to survive in
the environment in which we find ourselves. Thus, the imposition of the self is
not so much a philosophical doctrine as it is a psychological, and definitely an
epistemological, approach and attitude. It is this affirmation which becomes a
cornerstone in Nietzsche's quest to have men rise above the mediocrity which
marks the traditional human condition. Schacht points this out vividly.
From Zarathustra onward, he repeatedly recurs to the idea of such an 
"affirmation," and takes it to be of the utmost importance. It marks the 
point of his transcendence of nihilism; and, in conjunction with his 
comprehension of the 'total character' of existence that is thus affirmed, it 
yields the ultimate standard of value he identifies and proceeds to 
employ 43
In an educational sense, amor fati contributes to an understanding of an
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epistemology based upon a kind of self-gravity. This is beneficial to the
pedagogist in his understanding of the perceptions and perspectives of the
individual learners. As such, a pedagogy must take into account a concept of
affirmation for the learner, as well as the pedagogist. Danto remarks on this,
although his allusions are not directly associated with epistemology or education.
Still, his observation is applicable.
For it leads to what it has led to and always will. What we do either has 
intrinsic meaning or it has none. It is we who give value together with 
significance. This we m ust accept if there is to be meaning to our life (for 
we could not change it if we wished to): we m ust affirm ourselves in our 
fate.44
The affirmation of the self in its individual fate provides a basis of approach for 
the pedagogist, for it rejects a life of regretting, of resenting, of nihilism. As such, 
it promotes a concept of undaunted discovery in the human condition ~  a concept 
of affirmation in the task of apprehending the precepts of our world -  and even 
though Nietzsche calls us to go beyond this limit, we could not achieve such a 
reaching beyond without adopting the philosophy of amor fati.
2.04 Education Must Be Geared To the Development of the Whole Person
The culmination of the educational process Nietzsche would have us 
establish is the higher state of the hum an condition in the person of the ubermensch. 
Through love, the contest, and amor fati the pedagogist can create an environment 
which is not only conducive to such a culmination, but also is one which evolves 
an entirely different approach to the educative process — one which produces the
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creative, analytic being who can effect the revaluation of values and reject the 
nihilism of the herd. To do this, the pedagogist must concentrate on educating the 
individual learner as a whole being, not as another element in the perpetuation of 
the state.
His educational task would, it seemed to me, be to mould the whole man 
into a living solar and planetary system and to understand its higher laws 
of motion.45
Just as he admonished us to understand that "your educators can be only your
liberators,"46 so he encourages us to educate the "whole" being. Education
becomes, then, the process of liberation, and the liberated learner moves that
much closer to the higher state of the human condition.
There is an obvious equation between the concept of wholeness and the
concept of "culture." It is significant to note here that Graham Parkes in his
excellent exposition of Nietzsche's psychological concepts makes the point of
clarifying the uses of the terms "culture" and "education" by Nietzsche. Nietzsche
uses the German word Bildung when he talks of education, especially in On the
Future of Our Educational Institutions. Parkes points out the implications of the
translation of this word, as we begin to understand what Nietzsche means when
he applies both "education" and "culture" in his analyses of educational
institutions and enterprises.
The German translation, bilden, has the advantage of connoting the image 
(Bild) as well as the process of formation—which makes it all the more 
appropriate a term in the context of Bildung, which means both "education" 
and "culture."47
Culture, and hence education in this context, for Nietzsche is equivalent to
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liberation, and logically leads to the development of the whole being.
Culture is liberation, the removal of all the weeds, rubble and vermin that 
w ant to attack the tender buds of the plant, an outstreaming of light and 
warmth, the gentle rustling of nocturnal rain, it is imitation and worship 
of nature where nature is in her motherly and merciful mood, it is the 
perfecting of nature when it deflects her cruel and merciless assaults and 
turns them to good, and when it draws a veil over the expressions of 
nature's step-motherly mood and her sad lack of understanding.48
It is another response to Nietzsche's abhorrence of nihilism, for we cannot find
ourselves within nature if we have antipathy and ignorance of it. This is
overcome by educating the learner as a whole being in order to liberate him from
the confines of a system which will not allow him to evolve as a whole being.
M urphy notes that Nietzsche's vehement complaints of the educational system of
his day were based upon the recognition that those institutions did not, in fact,
educate with this in view.
When he turns to no-saying towards existing social institutions and 
academic practices, it is for their failure to integrate the products of 
philosophical activities of the academy into a harmoniously constructed 
whole aiming at the education of man as a whole and the possibility of the 
overman in particular.49
Obviously, Nietzsche was dismayed with the social climate of his time, and
more especially with the educational institutions which had become effective tools
of the state. Their concern was with education as a means of preserving the status
quo, of educating students with specific economic and professional placements in
mind, and with promoting the idea that education was a means to achieving a
financially secure end. To this Nietzsche was unalterably opposed.
Two seemingly antagonistic forces, equally deleterious in their actions and 
ultimately combining to produce their results, are at present ruling over
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our educational institutions, although these were based originally upon 
very different principles. These forces are: a striving to achieve the 
greatest possible extension of education on the one hand, and a tendency to 
minimise [sic] and to weaken it on the other. The first-named would fain 
spread learning among the greatest possible number of people, the second 
would compel education to renounce its highest and most independent 
claims in order to subordinate itself to the service of the State.50
The solution was the pedagogist who would educate with these higher principles
in mind, would consider the learner as an independent being, and would
integrate these two facts of the human condition into an approach which allowed
the learner to become himself.
Again, the concept of wholeness is interwoven with the concept of culture,
and culture in regard to education goes hand in hand with wholeness, as Sharp
points out.
Nietzsche envisioned the cultured person as one who had not only 
integrated the objects of culture into his very personality and being, but 
somehow had come to view knowledge as a tool in helping him to grow 
and become whole.51
Culture becomes a vehicle for the appreciation of knowledge within the learner,
who can then use it to become whole (i.e., to evolve to the higher state of the
hum an condition.)
Culture for Nietzsche is a life long process of growing in knowledge and 
power manifest in action. Of its very essence it involves pain, suffering 
and the destruction that is involved with all creation. Man alone has the 
ability to overcome his nature and create himself whole. It is this creation 
of wholeness which justifies his very existence.52
It is not surprising that a Nietzschean pedagogy would involve a kind of 
love, devotion to the contest, adherence to amor fati, and focus upon educating the 
whole person. It is implicit in all that Nietzsche writes, and its application is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
101
appropriate today.
3.00 Nietzschean Epistemology As Background
In a broad context, I term education to be the organization and effective
delivery of knowledge, as the apprehension of facts, information, feelings, and
interpretations of the world in which we find ourselves. The study of
epistemology is concerned with the manner in which we achieve this, and, as
such, is inseparable from education. This is to say, in order to understand or to
implement a system of teaching as pedagogy, we must understand the system
behind the approach or strategy of apprehending, justifying, and imparting
knowledge. In attempting to categorize a Nietzschean pedagogy, therefore, it is
appropriate to make a brief excursion into his concept of epistemology. This will
be a brief excursion, too, in that a detailed explanation of his entire epistemology
would involve far more than the limits of this dissertation. Still, I believe it is
imperative to offer a survey of his epistemology so that his pedagogy has some
foundational bearing.
Inasmuch as knowledge has to do with concepts of truth, it is rather
startling to find that Nietzsche tells us that there is no truth.
There are many kinds of eyes. Even the sphinx has eyes — and 
consequently there are many kinds of "truths", and consequently 
there is no truth.53
He binds truth to interpretation, which itself is bound to the interpreter. This 
concept is referred to as perspectivism, and it has significant implications for the
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pedagogist. He reinforces this connection with the pronouncement that "Rational 
thought is interpretation according to a scheme that we cannot throw off,"54 and 
further, that "Necessity is not a fact but an interpretation."55 Such damning 
utterances with regard to a rudimentary element of pedagogy and education 
seems antithetical to all his works and concerns with education, but in the 
inimitable Nietzschean sense, they do, in fact, offer a more clear vision in 
attempts to isolate a pedagogy which is uniquely Nietzschean.
3.01 Knowledge is a Personal Interpretation of the Universe
In the complex system which is our world, Nietzsche creates an
epistemology which is grounded in personal observation, personal interpretation,
and personal meaning. It includes personal truths, falsifications, and the
establishment of a body of facts which allow us to proceed intelligibly in that
world. Arthur Danto explains this concept of knowledge quite simply.
W hat passes at any time for knowledge is but a confection of
simplifications and falsifications, brought forth out of ourselves, by means 
of which we may house ourselves in the blank, indifferent universe.56
This is the basis for Nietzsche's concept of perspectivism. It involves setting the
boundaries for truth and, therefore, for knowledge. Truth becomes a function of
the perceiver and is "the kind of error without which a certain species of life
could not live."56 Yet even the "error" is a function of the perceiver and his
perspectival interpretation. We can know the world, therefore, but only on our
individual terms.
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In so far as the word "knowledge" has any meaning, the world is 
knowable; but it is interpretable otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but 
countless meanings.-- "Perspectivism."
It is our needs that interpret the world; our drives and their For and 
Against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective 
that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm.58
Justifiable belief is also a tenet of epistemology and of our individual
knowledge of our world, but belief alone, even if it is justifiable, is not enough
to establish truth, according to Nietzsche.
But that a belief, however necessary it may be for the preservation of a 
species, has nothing to do with truth, one knows from the fact that, e.g., 
we have to believe in time, space, and motion, without feeling compelled 
to grant them absolute reality.59
Even a willingness of truth does not establish it, except for the individual
perceiving it and applying it to his world. As such, truth and, therefore,
knowledge become functions of the perceiver who creates them.
Will to truth is a making firm, a making true and durable, an 
abolition of the false character of things, a reinterpretation of it into beings. 
"Truth" is therefore not something there, that might be found or discovered 
—but something that must be created and that gives a name to a process, 
or rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end-introducing truth, 
as a processus in infinitum, an active determining—not a becoming-conscious 
of something that is in itself firm and determined.60
Knowledge of our individual worlds, then, presents a problem in organizing it
with the intention of expressing that organization in an extended fashion.
This means, then, that the only world we can significantly speak of is the 
world from where we are. Consequently we cannot, save as an abstract 
possibility, speak significantly of another world, and certainly not of one 
that could be intelligible to us, given the conditions under which we have 
evolved this one.61
This is the essence of perspectival epistemology, that the individual gives
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meaning and significance to the world which he perceives and in which he 
functions; thus, there is no truth, only interpretations of fact. In effect, we each 
create our own universes which are subject to our willingness to extend them in 
any fashion, be it to another "universe" or to another concept.
Danto sums up perspectivism better than any explication which I have 
researched.
The doctrine that there are no facts but only interpretations was termed 
Perspectivism. To be sure, we speak of seeing the same thing from different 
perspectives, and we might allow that there is no way to see the thing save 
through a perspective and, finally, that there is no one perspective which 
is privileged over any other. These would be logical features of the 
concept of perspective itself. The only difficulty here is in talking about 
the "same thing" on which these are distinct perspectives. Certainly we 
cannot say what it is except from one or another perspective, and we 
cannot speak about it as it is in itself. "We cannot establish a fact an sich," 
Nietzsche wrote in an unpublished note, "and it is perhaps nonsense [ein 
Unsinn] to wish to do so." We can meaningfully say nothing, then, about 
whatever it is on which these are perspectives. We cannot speak of a true 
perspective, but only of the perspective that prevails. Because we cannot 
appeal to any fact independently of its relation to the perspective it is 
meant to support, we can do little more than insist on our perspective, and 
try, if we can, to impose it on other people. Common sense constitutes one 
perspective among many. And it, no less than the others, seeks to impose 
itself where it can: it is the metaphysics of the masses or, as Nietzsche will 
say, of the herd.62
The world each of us perceives, then, is a function of our interpretation of it and 
is trapped by the extended or limited dimensions of our individual abilities not 
only to perceive but also to conceive, as well. Nietzsche is very Heraclitean in the 
sense that the world is one of "flux" and of becoming, as opposed to static being. 
This is the difficulty in ascertaining a definitive, fixed concept of truth, and 
therefore knowledge. Thus, granting the world meaning through individual
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Richard Schacht has offered a more analytic interpretation of perspectivism 
which begins to give some structure to Nietzsche's perspectival epistemology. 
His analysis deals more with the concept of "truth" and its relationship to the rest 
of the world.
If truth is conceived as a correspondence of thought and being, therefore, 
or of a structurally articulated proposition to a comparably ordered state 
of affairs the features of which are fixed independently of the process 
through which it becomes an object of experience, there is and can be 
nothing of the kind. When Nietzsche asserts that "there is no truth," his 
point is that no propositions are or can be true in this sense.63
The process, then, becomes the thing by which truth is granted, and it is always
tied to perspectival interpretation. Each perspectival interpretation becomes a
function of a kind of "language game" each interpreter plays in establishing his
own universe, and the objects to which meaning is given are framed within that
linguistic structure.
What counts as an object, a difference between objects, and a relation 
between them, is determined by the concepts and rules of particular 
schemes of this sort, and has no standing or meaning independently of 
them.
The "truth" of a given proposition thus is a matter of its conformity 
to the linguistic-conceptual scheme within which it functions, together with 
its appropriateness in relation to some state of affairs holding among the 
objects that are fixed and constituted in accordance with this scheme.64
It is an accurate inference, then, that language, being a function of the
perspectival interpretation itself, becomes that symbol manipulator which assists
in organizing the individual universe and, further, that since the organizing
capabilities within the interpreter presuppose a kind of individual order unique
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to the interpreter, then the truth obtained is an obvious function of the interpreter.
Even when we organize our universes according to 'error', we do so with the
intention of structuring that universe into a schematic which has meaning for us.
Such propositions represent certain states of affairs as obtaining which do 
so only for us, and cannot be supposed to obtain independently of the 
"perspective" within which we happen to be operating. The terms in 
which such propositions are cast cannot appropriately be applied to the 
way the world is apart from our schematization of it; and so, however 
things may actually stand with the world, in relation to its nature such 
"truths" turn out to be "errors."65
As confusing as it may seem, the point is that truth and knowledge are
functions of the perceiver. The difficulty is in the manner perspectivism is
presented by Nietzsche. It was for him a venture which was not really
completed. His references to it are scattered throughout his works, but are a bit
more unified in his posthumously published The Will To Power, a collection of his
previously unpublished notes. Danto sums up this circumstance of Nietzsche's
perspectivism and attributes it to the newness of the "invention."
Like many innovators, he was not quite sure of the theory he invented, or 
perhaps that he had even invented a new theory. So the reader finds odd 
dissonances in his writing, somewhat like architectural disharmonies in a 
transitional church, where the style being groped toward has not yet 
emerged, and the architect might not even be sure that he is groping 
toward a new style at all.66
3.02 Pedaeogv Must Promote the Development of Personal Meaning in Education 
It would seem that such an epistemology would produce nothing but 
another kind of solipsism confined to the whims and preferences of the perceiver, 
but such is not the case for a Nietzschean pedagogy. Murphy aptly identifies the
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link between a pedagogy and perspectivism in declaring that "since one's
knowledge must be of an experiential quality, not an abstract theoretical kind,
Nietzsche urged the student to his own education."67 This would not be possible
if Nietzsche did not hold inviolate the sanctity of an individual perspective of the
universe, and in the creation of individual universes within each learner. It is the
learner who gives meaning to that which is experienced and ultimately learned.
Ultimately, man finds in things nothing but w hat he himself has imported 
to them: the finding is called science, the importing--art, religion, love, 
pride. Even if this should be a piece of childishness, one should carry on 
with both and be well disposed toward both—some should find; others— 
we othersl-should import!68
The manner in which each learner finds value and meaning, furthermore, is the
fashion in which he interprets the world in creating his own universe.
The value of the world lies in our interpretation(-that other interpretations 
than merely hum an ones are perhaps somewhere possible-); that previous 
interpretations have been perspective valuations by virtue of which we can 
survive in life, i.e., in the will to power, for the growth of power; that 
every elevation of man brings with it the overcoming of narrower 
interpretations; that every strengthening and increase of power opens up 
new perspectives and means believing in new horizons.69
The belief in "new horizons" is the hope of pedagogy and, as such, provides an
important foundation upon which to base an approach to education.
Significantly, these new horizons are ones which Nietzsche finds to be personal
for the learner. Herein lies the distinguishing element of Nietzsche's
epistemology for the purposes of pedagogy: the pedagogist must, of necessity,
understand and appreciate the view -the perspective- o f  the individual learner. It
is a world which is uniquely internal, personal, aggressive, and tentative all at the
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same time, and which further is under constant siege from the world outside it. 
The wise pedagogist, therefore, takes the learner on the learner's terms and 
through his own art assists the learner in expanding and achieving these new 
horizons.
A final comment as to the pedagogic approach offered by Nietzsche in his 
perspectivism comes from Zarathustra's observations "On War and Warriors." 
While it initially may appear to be an exultation of the glories of war as war, it 
really is an allusion to the apprehension of knowledge. The "warriors" are 
seeking wisdom and knowledge, and, if they cannot be "saints" in this "war," they 
can at least be "warriors." It is an application of perspectivism as applied to an 
aggressive pursuit of wisdom and knowledge, and it gives a wider scope to the 
meaning of perspectivism.
And if you cannot be saints of knowledge, at least be its warriors. 
They are the companions and forerunners of such sainthood.
I see many soldiers: would that I saw many warriors! "Uniform" 
one calls what they wear: would that what it conceals were not uniform!
You should have eyes that always seek an enemy—your enemy. 
And some of you hate at first sight. Your enemy you shall seek, your war 
you shall w age-for your thoughts. And if your thought be vanquished, 
then your honesty should still find cause for triumph in that. You should 
love peace as a means to new wars—and the short peace more than the 
long. To you I do not recommend work but struggle. To you I do not 
recommend peace but victory. Let your work be a struggle. Let your 
peace be a victory! One can be silent and sit still only when one has bow 
and arrow: else one chatters and quarrels. Let your peace be your 
victory!70
The warrior of knowledge finds that "peace" in the apprehension of self- 
knowledge and m ust constantly remain in a state of "war" in order to achieve the 
higher state of the human condition.
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Specific application of this concept of perspectivism comes in Part the Fifth, 
Section 3.03, with the explication of Corollary 3 which makes an analogy between 
education and the interpretation of Rorschach Ink Blots. It is a vital concept in 
the revaluation of contemporary education, and it has its pedagogical roots in 
Nietzsche's perspectival epistemology.
4.00 Applications of Nietzschean Pedagogy
The initial thrust of this dissertation is to identify Nietzsche's concepts of 
education, and it has been shown that he was concerned with education as the 
vehicle for the development of the ubermensch or the higher state of the human 
condition. Section 2.00 identified four elements of Nietzsche's educational 
philosophy: the love of the pedagogist, the necessity of the contest as agon, 
adherence to the philosophy of amor fati, and the development of the whole 
person. Corollary to this thrust is the application of those four elements into a 
viable pedagogy which is applicable for contemporary learners and for 
contemporary education.
This section will examine three applications of Nietzschean educational 
philosophy which develop a pedagogy. David Cooper's Authenticity and Learning: 
Nietzsche's Educational Philosophy was introduced in Part the Second, Section 3.03. 
Ann Margaret Sharp's "Education and Culture: A Nietzschean Perspective" offers 
the cultural background of Nietzsche's educational concerns. Her dissertation 
developed into a major article entitled "The Teacher as Liberator: A Nietzschean
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View" and was discussed in Section 2.01. Timothy Murphy's dissertation Teaching 
the Dance: Nietzsche as Educator was discussed in Section 2.02. All three authors 
develop elements of Nietzsche's educational philosophy into cogent systems. At 
the very least, they identify those important aspects of Nietzsche's pedagogy 
which are applicable today. They add to the validity of those concepts presented 
in Section 2.00, and this is their significant contribution not only to the 
dissertation at hand but also to the identification and development of a legitimate 
pedagogy which can be rightly identified as Nietzschean.
4.01 Cooper Identifies Nietzsche's Pedagogy as Being Predicated on Authenticity
In Authenticity and Learning: Nietzsche's Educational Philosophy, Cooper
examines the scope of Nietzsche's philosophy and sees a legitimate connection
between its main tenets and his philosophy of education, for Nietzschean
educational philosophy is interwoven throughout all his works. The concept of
"authenticity", as Cooper sees it, is the basis for understanding what Nietzsche
really means when he talks of education.
Authenticity is a quest for illumination—the true self must be allowed to 
shine through, and the attempts made to harmonize one's life with its 
dictates as a journey, through a jungle of distracting, false selves, towards 
the real one.71
The question for the pedagogist, then, is how this can be achieved, and in the final 
chapter of his book, Cooper offers four foci, as he calls them, from which a 
pedagogical base can be established. The four foci are philosophical, linguistic, 
aesthetic, and genealogical,72 and Cooper is quick to make the point that he does not
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intend to structure a curriculum as such, but rather, to offer approaches for the 
pedagogist.
I do not have in mind a schooling in which an hour of Descartes is 
followed by an hour of English grammar, with the afternoon dedicated to 
drawing or pottery. These foci are not to be thought of as subjects: they are 
attitudes, emphases, tactics perhaps, which are to permeate what goes on 
in the school, its teaching and other activities too. Nor are they to be 
thought of as clearly distinct from one another: like the spotlights in a 
theater, they criss and cross, sometimes merging to illuminate a single area, 
then parting, and always in soft outlines.73
In this sense they are mefa-educational, much along the lines of the Corollaries
offered in Part the Fifth, Section 3.00. They make a clear distinction, nevertheless,
between what education has been doing, and what it must do in a Nietzschean
construct.
When one thinks of "philosophical" in terms of education it often conjures
images of one seriously contemplating the great questions of the human
condition; however, Cooper has something else in mind when he presents this
focus. It is a consideration of how the learner develops a position, a stance, a
firm set of convictions from which he can operate in his world.
The understanding to be developed through education [should] be of a 
type that is firmly geared to the individual's self-conscious adoption of 
stances towards the significant situation which he confronts as a human 
being.74
It is that kind of understanding which develops into meaning for the individual 
learner. Each of us is expected to take a stance on issues of political, economic, 
or social circumstances, and it is education which must provide us the 
opportunity to engage them on an even plane with others, as well as on a plane
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with our true selves. It also must provide us with the foundation from which we 
can firmly affix those stances. Thus, a philosophical understanding through 
education allows of a variety of investigations which contribute to the 
development of those stances. It may be reading great literature, solving a 
mathematical proof, analyzing some work of art or music, or just spending time 
in reflection. The pedagogist must be cognitively versatile enough to promote an 
atmosphere in which the learner can develop a philosophical understanding— 
which, in the Nietzschean sense, is the first step toward the higher state of the 
hum an condition.
The focus of "linguistic" understanding is "not to be sharply distinguished
from the 'philosophical' one,"75 as Cooper points out. It is more a sense of what
the language means in its use. It is not to be construed as a concept outside itself;
that is to say, the linguistic nuances of a particular set of symbols do not
automatically imply a given meaning to a thing or concept. Often we assign
meanings, or "essences" as Cooper calls them, to linguistic constructs which can
overwhelm the learner. This overwhelming sense can be averted only by a
thorough understanding of the language in all its complexity. Nietzsche called
for a deeper study of language by all students-of course, he was a philologist by
profession. Still, the point is valid: without understanding the meanings of words
in the totality of their linguistic contexts, an education becomes limited at best.
As Cooper sums up,
The general point is that serious reflection on one's beliefs and values can 
only begin when one ceases to assume that the words or concepts arising
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in this reflection express essences, that there need be any interesting 
uniformity across time or space, in what is being said, denied, valued, or 
condemned with their help.76
To understand the linguistic distinctions in a given set of symbols, even with their
deceptions, is of vital importance in the formulation of cognitive appreciation and
awareness, and Cooper makes the point well.
Cooper's third focus is "aesthetic," but again, his concept does not fit the
normal definition. He calls for a kind of balance with this focus-the balance
between one's perception and one's sensation, between one's analyticity and one's
appreciation. Education does this in the form of what Cooper calls "the play;"
some may call it recess, some may refer to it as the balance achieved in the dance,
as does Murphy. In this sense, however, Cooper's concept of authenticity
applicable to learning is achieved in a "microcosm."77 It gives the learner an
opportunity to participate in his universe with a well developed sense of balance
between what one senses and what one perceives.
The final focus for Cooper is "genealogical." In this focus, he is concerned
with the ability of the learner to examine the genesis of his values and beliefs.78
Through this kind of understanding and education, the learner is capable of
establishing a personal history, if you will, of the value system he has developed.
From this examination, he will be able to defend, explain, and expand his
situation in a more cognitive context. His position will be more solidly founded,
and this genre of examination will also yield a stronger sense of the self. As such,
it affords a platform from which the higher state of the human condition can be
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achieved.
In all, Cooper's foci allow of a Nietzschean pedagogy in that they center 
on the development of values appealing beyond the herd mentality. These foci 
lay a good foundation for the Corollaries in Part the Fifth, Section 3.00, but more 
than that, they begin to explain Nietzsche's concern with education and its 
function in the human condition.
4.02 Sharp Analyzes the Educator as Liberator
I would be remiss if I were not to acknowledge Ann Margaret Sharp's 
dissertation, The Teacher as Liberator: A Nietzschean View, which gave rise to two 
articles having to do with the applications of Nietzsche's philosophy of education 
and which have been crucial in the development of this dissertation: "Education 
and Culture: A Nietzschean Perspective" and "The Teacher as Liberator: A 
Nietzschean View." Her observations significantly add to the spirit of this 
dissertation in that they isolate some of Nietzsche's educational concepts so that 
they can be formed into a meaningful pedagogy. Furthermore, they build upon 
what Cooper and Murphy have established. Her astute evaluations of Nietzsche's 
view of his nineteenth century Germany and their similarities to our twentieth 
century America were cited in Part the First, Section 2.00, and in Part the Second, 
Section 3.03, her assessments of the Nietzschean concept of culture were cited. 
The overall import of her work is that it presents an intriguing explication of 
Nietzsche's philosophy of education.
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As an interesting aside, it might be added here that in researching this area 
of discovery in University Microfilm Dissertation Abstracts I was able to find only 
forty-six dissertations which have general application, and of those forty-six there 
were only a scant two which have direct bearing on this study—Sharp's and 
Timothy M urphy's Teaching the Dance: Nietzsche as Educator, which is expanded 
in the next section. It was, indeed, quite a revelation that this area of Nietzschean 
philosophy has received so little attention; thus, the work here may prove to be 
more significant than I had originally assumed.
It was Sharp's examination of the Nietzschean concept of love between the 
educator and the learner which occupied Section 2.01 of this Part. However, it 
is her treatment of Nietzsche's doctrine of the educator as liberator, alluded to in 
Section 2.04 of this Part, which is of major interest here. She expands on 
Nietzsche's pronouncement in "Schopenhauer as Educator" that "your educators 
can be only your liberators."79 This liberation begins with the love which is 
established between the educator and the learner, but it becomes more clear as 
we view Sharp's assessment of the stages of the camel, the lion, and the child as 
are presented in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. These stages are the development of the 
spirit and entail the specific task of self over-coming.
Of three metamorphoses of the spirit I tell you: how the spirit 
becomes a camel, and the camel a lion and the lion finally a child.80
Sharp's explication not only shows us what Nietzsche means with this
metamorphosis, but also offers an in-depth analysis of the role the educator is to
play at each stage in the process of this development. In her examination, we can
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see a very succinct Nietzschean pedagogy.
It is first important to understand that "Nietzsche's philosophy of education 
is a dialectical process of moving from the stage of dependence to the stage of 
independence" and that "it requires the student's consistently engaging in self­
overcoming."81 This process necessarily entails three distinct stages of education 
as overcoming, and a full appreciation of the difficult tasks it involves.
What is most difficult, O heroes, asks the spirit that would bear 
much, that I may take it upon myself and exult in my strength?
Or is it this: feeding on the acorns and grass of knowledge and, for 
the sake of truth, suffering hunger in one's soul?
Or is it this: stepping into filthy waters when they are the waters of 
truth, and not repulsing cold frogs and hot toads?
All these most difficult things the spirit that would bear much takes 
upon itself: like the camel that, burdened, speeds into the desert, thus the 
spirit speeds into its desert.82
This is the stage of laying a foundation, if you will, upon which to build a
corridor to self-overcoming and to self-discovery. No learner can master those
skills of any venture until he has mastered the most rudimentary of its principles.
At this stage, the student begins the development of basic skills.
[The student] learns to develop skills in reading, writing, mathematics and 
rhetoric. It is characterized by the development of the right kind of habits 
that will be useful in solving experiential problems. It is during this time 
that the student also develops a reverence and respect for the great works 
of the past, not through dull and boring lectures but by virtue of his 
intimacy with his teacher.82
An emphasis must be placed upon two pedagogical elements here: the position
of the pedagogist and the importance of experiential learning. The pedagogist
m ust realize his role as a perfect model for his learner, in addition to insisting
that the learner participate in the process of learning on an individual and first­
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hand level. This also implies that the basis is being laid for the creation of a
better individual, as well as the creation of a better social structure—of not only
self-overcoming, but also of overcoming the present social structure.
The task of the educator during this initial stage is to guide the student to 
an awareness of his capacity for critical thinking. Given the ability to think 
critically and to attain a knowledge of why things are, the student feels 
that man should cease being ashamed of himself and thus take upon 
himself the responsibility for creating a better community. Thus, by means 
of educators, the student could begin the process of self-liberation, which 
means ceasing to let one's life be some hapless accident and taking each 
moment seriously. It means developing the capacity for guiding and 
shaping one's future and in effect creating one-self.83
It is at this stage of development, too, that the learner begins to understand 
the meaning of discipline and obedience. One could argue that Nietzschean 
pedagogy would stifle creativity with its heavy emphasis on "obedience," 
"discipline," and the like. In actuality, it is through this disciplining rigor that the 
learner comes to appreciate his creativity. Obedience implies a kind of self- 
discipline which enhances creativity. In this context, creativity was never meant 
to imply intellectual anarchy, nor a kind of loose-cannon approach to those 
creative urges each learner soon discovers within his soul. Thus, when Nietzsche 
speaks of "the hard school" which is designed to teach obedience, he is speaking 
of the self-overcoming of those elements of the spirit which would mislead and 
misdirect creativity. As such, obedience is a necessary element in the training and 
channeling of creativity. It can only be effectively released through self­
overcoming, which can only emerge as a result of discipline and obedience. Yet, 
he is quick to point out that this is no easy task.
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Everybody who is in earnest in this matter will have the same sort of 
experience as the recruit in the army who is compelled to learn walking 
after having walked almost all his life as a dilettante or empiricist. It is a 
hard time: one almost fears that the tendons are going to snap and one 
ceases to hope that the artificial and consciously acquired movements and 
positions of the feet will ever be carried out with ease and comfort. It is 
painful to see how awkwardly and heavily one foot is set before the other, 
and one dreads that one may not only be unable to learn the new way of 
walking, but that one will forget how to walk at all. Then it suddenly 
become[s] noticeable that a new habit and a second nature have been born 
of the practiced movements, and that the assurance and strength of the old 
manner of walking returns with a little more grace.84
Perhaps this analogy is a bit laborious; however, it serves the purpose of pointing 
out how obedience and discipline are necessary in the process of self-overcoming, 
of learning. At the same time, it is a process which results in growth, and growth 
leads to the stage of the lion.
The stage of the lion is characterized by a further expansion of the learner's 
knowledge of his universe, but more, it is a continuation of the process of self­
overcoming, which here yields an attitude of rejection, of negation, and of 
repudiation. It is a natural progression of the cognitive process, too, in that once 
the learner has been exposed to the fundamentals of self-discovery, he begins to 
question everything—even his pedagogist. Remembering the image of the spirit 
as camel speeding into the desert, at this stage we find the spirit alone in the 
desert evolving into a lion.
In the loneliest desert, however, the second metamorphosis occurs: here 
the spirit becomes a lion who would conquer his freedom and be master 
in his own desert. Here he seeks out his last master: he wants to fight him 
and his last god.85
The spirit as a lion questions to the point of negation as a means to establishing
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a firm base of knowledge, a sense of self, a sense of authenticity.
To the student in this stage anything is permitted which does not 
compromise his integrity. The intellectual conscience becomes the 
touchstone of the authenticity of his will to power. The student is 
beginning to view life as it is, together with the battle of the instincts, the 
contradiction of the senses, and the bold experimentation toward 
sublimation.86
It is here that a sense of self-affirmation through a negation and through a 
confrontation with his pedagogist that the learner begins to deal with a sense of 
the synthesis of facts, knowledge, ideas, creativity, and ultimately with the critical 
analysis which accompanies self-overcoming. It is, at the same time, this 
profession of negation which is essential to freedom, and it functions as a 
prerequisite to creativity, and the quest to creating new values.87 W ithout it, the 
reality the learner creates would have little validity, for it would still be tied to 
the interpretations of others. This negation eventually takes the form of 
confrontation with the pedagogist in a challenging posture—a repudiation of all 
for which the pedagogist has stood—in order to acquire a sense of synthesis of the 
universe which the learner is creating. Thus, the pedagogist m ust stand well 
affixed in his position during this stage, for the learner will realize to his own 
shock that he becomes responsible for his own fate, his own universe, his own 
pronouncements.
The educator m ust be there, strong, resolute, and acting with deep 
conviction, continuing to be himself—the model. This standing can reflect 
one's belief that, yes, the student has set out on his own, but he will be 
successful. Because the educator has gone through the same process 
himself and has attained the point where he could affirm and create, he 
not only realizes what is happening to the student but has faith that he 
will make it through this stage. He realizes that after his first dizziness
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with negation the student will realize that he has negated all absolutes, all 
foundations, all ground, and will sense the horror of infinity. The educator 
knows it will be a painful process, and yet it is necessary.88
The strength of the pedagogist in this stage will assist the learner in dealing with
the "horror of infinity" and, thus, will lead to the final stage of the development
of the spirit, that of the child.
In the stage of the child we see the affirmation to which Nietzsche views
as essential in the efforts to reach the higher state of the hum an condition. The
acceptance of amor fati, of embracing the struggle of life, and of saying "Yes!" to
life are all achieved at the stage of the child, for the child is innocence.
The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self- 
propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred "Yes." For the game of 
creation, my brothers, a sacred "Yes" is needed: the spirit now wills his 
own will, and he who had been lost to the world now conquers his own 
world.89
The facing of infinity with all its complexities demands the acceptance of the
nature of flux and of constant becoming within its concept. This can be a horrific
realization if the learner does not embrace it with a feeling of openness, of
willingness, of the stability of its changing composition. Only the child could
joyfully employ such an approach, and this is the ultimate end of education—the
creation of the individual in the higher state of the human condition who can be
personally responsible and who can overcome not only himself but the mundane
approaches of the herd.
The stage of the child is the aim and end of education. The child is 
Nietzsche's symbol of the overman...Nietzsche at times characterizes this 
stage as a stage of being which affirms the innocence of becoming. Devoid 
of resentment and revenge against the eternal flux of all becoming, the
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child is totally affirmative, totally yea-saying and thus is capable of 
creativity.90
This stage results in the freedom of the spirit, and the product of freedom is the
discovery of true creativity. And it is here that the learner as a child becomes
friends, colleagues with the pedagogist in the Nietzschean quest for the
development of the higher state of the human condition.
They are both characterized by an affirmation toward all of existence and 
by a lack of revenge; they share a certain innocence, characterized by their 
acceptance of the constant flux of all becoming and their love of eternal 
recurrence. Because they can control their passions, they are not afraid of 
them. They love them and are able to use them in their work as creators 
of meaning. Out of fullness and joy they are capable of loving each other 
and working toward the creation of new values. They both share a certain 
quality of being which sets them apart from others. Their intense 
concentration on their own and each other's self-perfection flows into their 
every action, as does their gratitude for life itself. They give because they 
love and have something to give; they give because they are thankful. 
Somehow they are marked by a certain maturity.91
And so, the educator, the pedagogist becomes the liberator of the learner.
He has brought the learner to the stage at which the learner can accept the
universe as it is, see his place in it, and can begin to revaluate its meaning.
Perhaps Sharp best sums this up in the following excerpt.
Nietzsche's educational philosophy culminates in a picture of the free, 
powerful man who views existence as innocent. Master of himself, this 
man has become childlike again, full of wonder. He has mastered the art 
of self-overcoming and has learned to endure the pain of destruction in 
order to prepare for this self-creativity. He is constantly engaged in the 
process of integrating the antinomies of his nature into a unified whole; his 
instincts and passions are a very important part of him and manifest 
themselves in all of his actions.92
The sense of wonder is still primal in the apprehension of knowledge, for
wonderment is the beginning of all understanding, and for Nietzsche this is the
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essence of self-overcoming—the attainment of that sense of innocent wonderment 
which allows one to see with a broader Weltanschauung, world-view. At the same, 
time this development might be characterized as a journey from the sense of 
wonderment to the sense of appreciation. When the learner has apprehended his 
sense of wonderment, he develops a sense of appreciation. It is appreciation 
which allows him to participate in the essence of the object of appreciation so that 
the learner becomes a part of it, and it becomes a part of him. Understanding this 
journey from wonderment to appreciation indicates a crucial element in the 
evolution to the higher state of the human condition.
The control over one's passions is important in understanding self­
overcoming for Nietzsche, and is vital in ascending to the higher state of the 
hum an condition. It is not so much a repression of passions as it is a sublimation 
of them, of a directing them in a creative, integrated whole being who is at the 
same time a part of and beyond the pettiness of the world of the herd. A mark 
of this type of person in the higher state of the human condition is the ability to 
dance, and Timothy M urphy focuses on this concept.
4.03 M urphy's Teaching the Dance as a Model for Nietzschean Pedagogy
In his essay, "What the Germans Lack" in Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche
names three components of a solid and comprehensive education: seeing,
thinking, and, grouped together, speaking and writing.
The three tasks for which educators are required. One must learn to see, 
one m ust learn to think, one must learn to speak and write: the goal in all
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three is a noble culture.93
When he analyzes the importance of thinking he states, "That thinking wants to
be learned like dancing, as a kind of dancing."94 He further adds that dancing is
to be part of a "noble education."
For one cannot subtract dancing in every form from a noble education—to 
be able to dance with one's feet, with concepts, with words: need I still add 
that one must be able to do it with the pen too—that one must learn to
write?95
It is this allusion to the dance which Nietzsche suggests throughout his works 
which is of significance in Timothy M urphy's dissertation, Teaching the Dance: 
Nietzsche as Educator. While this work does not suggest any specific pedagogical 
system which can be identified as Nietzschean, it does offer a groundwork and 
a meffl-educational observation from which can be derived a Nietzschean 
pedagogy.
M urphy's analysis of the contest, the agon, has been presented in Section
2.02 of this Part, but it calls for education to embrace the concept of the contest 
as a constant struggle in the quest for education and knowledge. Without such 
a contest there would be little motivation to change, to understand, or to grow. 
The dance is a form of this contest, as agon. In the dance, all the elements of 
learning are present: perception, coordination, reflection, decision, and 
implementation. In effect, these elements represent the daily struggles of life in 
the hum an condition. It is the concept of the wholeness of an education, of a 
pedagogy which is embodied here, for clearly Nietzsche was concerned with 
teaching the philosophy of life.
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For the symbol of dancing reflects Nietzsche's philosophical concern that 
hum an life be the subject ultimately of all activity, that the contest is the 
instrument of educational experiment, and that dance affords a symbol of 
the creative ethic which is the heart of his anthropological vision.95
The dance, then, becomes a symbol for the integrated education of the whole
person, the ubermensch, or the higher state of the human condition.
M urphy's call is for pedagogists to take this into account as they prepare
an approach, a method for the delivery of knowledge. The approach must take
into account the concept of wholeness.
The dance educates the whole human person. One cannot teach someone 
to dance by training only the arms, say, or the legs; one educates a dancer, 
not any of h is/her constitutive elements. By holding the dance as the 
educational ideal, therefore, Nietzsche is proposing that culture as a whole 
should educate persons in toto. An education, properly speaking, trains, 
informs, and generates whole persons, not the kind of students [Nietzsche] 
saw emerging from the institutions of his day, students warped to the 
demands of scientism, technicism, or Statism...it is clear that Nietzsche 
thought that education should not develop merely some talents, but all 
those elements which compose both the margin and periphery of an 
individual. The dance quite adequately and beautifully symbolizes this 
concern; for a student of the dance cannot develop some part of his/her 
body to the exclusion of the others. Education must be thorough and of 
the whole person.97
This call, then, gives the pedagogist the imperative to consider all the elements 
of the individual, the elements of the knowledge to be imparted, and the 
overview of an appeal to something which is beyond the traditional approaches 
to education.
Inasmuch as the goal of education in a Nietzschean construct is the 
development of the higher state of the human condition, which results in greater 
creativity and an ultimate revaluation of values, the image of the dance is most
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appropriate to the enterprises of education and pedagogy. In it, we find the
creative consolidation which for a Nietzschean pedagogy is fundamental and
crucial. At the same time, it gives a clearer perspective to an individual's place
in the scheme of nature, bringing him closer to nature, and, thus, to himself.
In short, dancing means to Nietzsche all the creative forms of existence that 
advance hum an power. All dances are not of equal value, of course, 
depending upon what values and meanings they embody. Nevertheless, 
as existence is a dance, so too is creativity. The dance is the playful 
struggle of m an with meaning.98
Through teaching the dance, we see the culmination of a pedagogy which 
embraces those elements of education leading to the development of the higher 
state of the hum an condition. All the grace, all the physical strength, all the 
cognitive decisions, all the applications of these facets of the human condition 
combine into one, unified, integrated action which is uniquely human: teaching 
the dance—a Nietzschean pedagogy.
5.00 Transitional Commentary 
When we look at a Nietzschean pedagogy with its insistence upon personal 
excellence, personal responsibility, creativity, and critical thinking, we might make 
the misassumption that it is an esoteric exercise in which myopia looms larger 
than theory. Combined with the traditional prejudice which has been typical of 
approaches to Nietzsche's philosophical pronouncements this is not a surprising 
consequence; nevertheless, it is a fallacia consequentis of the most egregious genre. 
It can be seen from the research that Nietzsche's philosophy of education
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permeated throughout the entire corpus of his work, that it was a preoccupation 
of his philosophy, for it was the vehicle from which the ubermensch, the higher 
state of the human condition, was to have emerged. Clearly the vehicle for the 
delivery of such a vital concept, of such an integral commodity for the 
enhancement of the human condition had to be one which would be consistent 
with the aims of the philosopher and the structure of the world he envisioned. 
As such, it its imperative that the importance of Nietzsche's philosophy of 
education not be minimized.
More important, however, is the fact that Nietzsche's educational and 
pedagogical precepts are much more than mere theory, more than mere symbolic 
manipulation of human ventures in a conceptual jaunt. This has been seen in the 
practical applications of Nietzsche's educational philosophy by such education 
theorists as Cooper, Sharp, Murphy, and, yes, even Montessori. Their work 
validates Nietzsche's philosophy in a general sense, but even more so, their work 
validates Nietzsche's philosophy of education in a very specific sense.
An extension of their observations and applications continues in the next 
Part where this dissertation presents seven Corollaries for a Revaluation of 
Contemporary Education. These Corollaries are a natural progression of Nietzsche's 
general concept of the revaluation of all values, the main task of the ubermensch, 
or that being who has achieved the higher state of the human condition. It is 
important, therefore, to examine Nietzsche's revaluation pronouncements as 
introduction to the Corollaries, for it is obvious that they lay the foundation upon
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which the Corollaries stand. More significantly, perhaps, is that Nietzsche's 
concept of revaluation presents an interesting alternative for our pedagogical 
enterprises in that they reaffirm a concept of education which will promote 
critical thinking, creativity, and individuality.
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Part the Fifth: The Revaluation
Education is not the filling of a pail, hut the lighting of a fire.
—William Butler Yeats
1.00 Nietzsche's Concept of Revaluation
The term revaluation alluded to in Part the Third, Section 2.00, is of the
genre which can conjure up all sorts of images, connotations, denotations,
implications, and inferences, but, in the final analysis, its ominous echoes are not
as apocalyptic as the imagination may envision. Still, the genesis of this concept
of Nietzsche's was a very practical outcome of what he perceived to be the result
of the nihilism which was prevalent in his nineteenth century Germany. His call
for the "revaluation of all values" was a clarion trumpet to wake his
contemporaries from a stupor which had given rise to a generation of mindless
drifting, of paying tribute to institutions and practices which had taken the spirit
of the hum an condition and had reduced it to the emptiness of negation.
Creativity had become hollow, and critical thinking had become a redundant
epithet to whatever powers had taken political or economic control.
The health of our civilization appeared to him severely threatened: 
it looked impressively good, but seemed to Nietzsche thoroughly 
undermined—a diagnosis which, though trite today, was perhaps no
133
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mean feat in the eighteen-eighties.1 
With this as a backdrop, he sought the creation of a new breed of being who 
could see through the vapid morality of his time and could transcend not only 
himself, but all of humanity, to evolve an entirely different system of approach 
and behavior for the human condition—an approach and behavior which would 
be a revaluation.
1.01 Self-Examination for the Human Condition is Entailed in the Revaluation 
To gain a better comprehension of this revaluation, we must turn to 
Kaufmann who clearly understood the concept as not a pouring of "new wine",2 
but rather, a rejection of those values which had brought about nihilism, negation, 
"no-saying".
In other words, the "revaluation" means a war against accepted valuations, 
not the creation of new ones.3
This becomes more lucid when we look at what Nietzsche reveals about the
revaluation in Ecce Homo. In that text, he justifies and critiques his works in the
chapter entitled "Why I Write Such Good Books". In the section having to do
with Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche offers a more vivid motivation and
explanation of this concept.
After the Yes-saying part of my task had been solved, the turn had come 
for the No-saying, No-doing part: the revaluation of our values so far, the 
great war — conjuring up a day of decision. This included the slow search 
for those related to me, those who prompted by strength, would offer me 
their hands for destroying.4
The "great war" is the great task of self-overcoming, of emerging from the morass
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
135
of despair with the world as it is to the realization that the greatest of struggles 
are not external but are internal, and having once conquered, then engaging the 
world "out there", to transform it by the creation of values which are re-valued. 
In a lengthy excerpt from "Why I Am a Destiny" in Ecce Homo, this "war" becomes 
focused.
Revaluation of all values: that is my formula for an act of supreme self- 
examination on the part of humanity, become flesh and genius in me. It 
is my fate that I have to be the first decent human being; that I know 
myself to stand in opposition to the mendaciousness of millennia. —I was 
the first to discover the truth by being the first to experience lies as lies— 
smelling them out. —My genius is in my nostrils.
I contradict as has never been contradicted before and am 
nevertheless the opposite of a No-saying spirit. I am a bringer of glad 
tidings like no one before me; I know tasks of such elevation that any 
notion of them has been lacking so far; only beginning with me are there 
hopes again. For all that, I am necessarily also the man of calamity. For 
when truth enters into a fight with the lies of millennia, we shall have 
upheavals, a convulsion of earthquakes, a moving of mountains and 
valleys, the like of which has never been dreamed of. The concept of 
politics will have merged entirely with a war of spirits; all power 
structures of the old society will have been exploded—all of them are based 
on lies: there will be wars the like of which have never yet been seen on 
earth. It is only beginning with me that the earth knows great politics.5
This relates well to his concept of self-overcoming in the higher state of the human
condition, as well as to the integration of human action with the human spirit in
the human condition. The war is one of values, not necessarily of flesh and
blood, although they may become the weapons and casualties in such a
monumental conflict. Kaufmann reminds us again that
The "revaluation" is not a new value-legislation but a reversal of prevalent 
valuations—not from a new vantage point, nor arbitrary, but an internal 
criticism: the discovery of what Nietzsche variously refers to as 
"mendaciousness," "hypocrisy," and "dishonesty."6
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It is a criticism based upon that which is already in place; that which will of its
own weight cry for a redefinition, a restatement, a reaffirmation, a revaluation. It
will not come about from the work of a lone philosopher—or pedagogist either,
for that matter—but rather, will evolve and will be revealed when man reaches the
higher state of the human condition.
The revaluation is not the accomplishment of the individual philosopher 
who enters the arena to tackle ancient valuations and to reverse them as 
a sport; rather, "the values we have had hitherto thus draw their final 
consequence" (The Will to Power, Preface 4); "the highest values devaluate 
themselves" (The Will to Power 2). This Nietzsche can call the revaluation — 
in the same note in which he defines it as "a courageous becoming 
conscious"—a "saying Yes to what has been attained" (The Will to Power 
1007)7
The revaluation is the natural consequence of the existing value structure seeking 
its own balance, in a word. Once the no-sayers have saturated the structure, it 
will, of its own self-gravity, re-establish its initial mission.
In this vein, then, it is a "Yes-saying" to the human condition, to the world 
of which it is a part, and from which it emerged. It is not a destruction of the old 
value system, but rather a rediscovery of those values for which it was originally 
established—the hopeful attainment of the higher state of the human condition. 
Through the revaluation, man can again affirm life, but now on a plane of 
existence which is higher, more fruitful, more meaningful.
1.02 Revaluation for Education is in an Analysis of the Stage of the Lion
The manner in which this revaluation relates to a Nietzschean pedagogy can 
be seen when we return to the three stages of the development of the spirit found
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in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, referred to by Sharp in her analysis and cited in Part 
the Fourth, Section 4.02. The second stage is that of the lion who has fled to the 
desert to seek the sense of self. The self is sought through conflict with all that 
the lion has hitherto held dear, even his former pedagogist; but "for ultimate 
victory he wants to fight the great dragon."8 This great dragon is a metaphor for 
all that can hold the lion back from achieving his sense of self, his sense of 
destiny, his embrace of amor fati.
Who is the great dragon whom the spirit will no longer call lord 
and god? "Thou shalt" is the name of the great dragon. But the spirit of 
the lion says, "I will." "Thou shalt" lies in his way, sparkling like gold, an 
animal covered with scales; and on every scale shines a golden "thou 
shalt."
Values, thousands of years old, shine on these scales; and thus 
speaks the mightiest of all dragons: "All value of all things shines on me. 
All value has long been created, and I am all created value. Verily, there 
shall be no more T will/" Thus speaks the dragon."9
There must be a reason for this yearning, this longing in the lion to seek such a
confrontation. It is not an arbitrary whim or a capricious, momentary preference
which may happen to dance across the emotions of the lion. This confrontation
has a more solid base, for it leads to a freedom through a revaluation of all that
the lion has come to know and to accept--and even the lion's pedagogist, his
mentor stands in the way.
To create new values—that even the lion cannot do; but the creation 
of freedom for oneself for new creation—that is within the power of the 
lion. The creation of freedom for oneself and a sacred "No" even to duty-- 
for that, my brothers, the lion is needed. To assume the right to new 
values-that is the most terrifying assumption for a reverent spirit that 
would bear much. Verily, to him it is preying, and a matter for a beast of 
prey. He once loved "thou shalt" as most sacred: now he must find 
illusion and caprice even in the most sacred, that freedom from his love
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may become his prey; the lion is needed for such a prey.10 
This is the burden which the developing spirit must assume and accept—freedom 
through a revaluation of all which the spirit as lion has accepted without 
examination.
In short, from the perspective of Nietzsche's philosophy of education, the 
revaluation is a necessary development in the human condition: it is the practical 
application of that development within the spirit to the universe and to its 
institutions, for it leads to the stage of the child in which a true revaluation can 
manifest itself. The child is perfect innocence, perfect affirmation, perfect "Yes- 
saying" to the universe in which he finds himself. The revaluation, then, becomes 
personified in the being of the child-the transcendence of all the 
"mendaciousness" of the herd, to the higher state of the human condition.
2.00 Revaluation for Education
The intent of this dissertation is the justification of a revaluation of those 
tfjeta-educational principles which have resulted in the mediocre conditions we 
find in our schools and institutions today. Those conditions have been recited in 
Part the First, Section 2.00. In that Section, too, we saw the similarities between 
Nietzsche's nineteenth century Germany and our contemporary social and 
educational climate. The similarities are too obvious to deny, and, for this reason 
alone, the application of a Nietzschean pedagogy is justifiable. And yet, his 
philosophy of education seems so radically and diametrically opposed to the
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educational philosophy which has permeated our schools in the past eight 
decades that its application warrants a defense.
Briefly, our American education system during the past eight decades has 
been heavily influenced by the work of John Dewey, that great American 
philosopher whose views amalgamated our principles of democracy and of 
pedagogy. Our praise of "equality" through democracy-even to our worshipping 
of it at the expense of individuality—has bred almost a contempt for the strong 
being, the ubermensch. Our praise of the "average Joe" has been deified, and the 
sacrificial lamb, so to speak, has been the attainment of the higher state of the 
hum an condition. In fact, the history of anti-intellectualism has run rampant 
throughout our history beginning with the characterization of such symbols of 
education as "Ichabod Crane" in "The Headless Horseman", and culminating in 
the naming of intelligent beings as "eggheads", "nerds", and "geeks". Owing to 
Dewey's belief that socialization takes place best in the schools we have relegated 
our schools to the position in which they have become less a beacon for our 
societal structure and more a mirror of it. Instead of being the nest for the 
creation of beings with creativity and critical thinking, they have become the 
incubators of mediocrity, celebrating this mediocrity as the summum bonum in our 
quest for "equality". Without delving into the distorted definition we have 
ascribed to it, "equality" was never meant to be total egalitarianism-but that 
excursion warrants yet another dissertation which would be voluminous.
There have been two locutions which have served America well in its
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development as a world leader: First, is the celebration of that uniquely American 
being who is the "rugged individualist"--a concept which Nietzsche would accept 
and also celebrate; second, is the Biblical directive to "help thy neighbor", to "be 
thy brother's keeper". We have long survived the tension between these two 
locutions in all our ventures, be they social, political, economic, philosophical, or 
educational. Yet within the past eight decades our concentration upon helping 
our neighbor has put us in a position of great peril in our schools, particularly in 
the development of beings who are characteristically creative and critically 
analytic. This fact owes its heritage to Dewey's conceptions of the purpose of our 
educational institutions. Those conceptions are best summed up in the following 
excerpt.
Education, according to Dewey, is the process of imposing on the impulse 
of infants the society or the set of group habits into which the infants are 
born; it is the perpetuation of society. But it is also a good deal more. For 
since one of the habits to be imposed upon impulse is that of acting 
intelligently, education must also foster the reform of society toward an 
ever better condition. To perpetuate intelligence is to begin its use, and the 
schools are thus the basis for social progress.11
Thus, while Dewey seems to imply that somehow "acting intelligently" will
emerge from an institution which has become a hostage to its social whims, it is
apparent that such an emergence is mythical at best, owing to the sad fact of its
insistence upon the perpetuation of its own bureaucratic security. In short,
Dewey's views of education have emphasized the perpetuation of the social order
—"help thy neighbor"~at the expense of the development of intelligence through
creativity and critical thinking-the "rugged individual", in Nietzsche's terms, the
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ubermensch. This may seem an over-simplification, but its verification comes by 
merely visiting any one of our schools, particularly in our inner cities. It is also 
apparent when one looks at what has happened to some of our more prolific 
institutions of higher learning in the past three decades, such as City College of 
New York. In his book review of James Traub's City On a Hill, Dr. Morton 
Teicher chronicles the kind of tragic consequences which have taken place at that 
fine institution in one sentence: "An academic giant was reduced to a curative 
college, teaching the six R's: remedial reading, remedial writing and remedial 
arithmetic."12
Carrying on this observation would degenerate into an odious diatribe; 
suffice it to say that a Nietzschean pedagogy fits well into the concept of "rugged 
individualism," as well as fitting in with Dewey's concern for the perpetuation of 
intelligence. The question, then, becomes one of defining the purpose of 
intelligence. Nietzsche would insist on its utility in the development of the higher 
state of the human condition, whereas Dewey would claim it is to be used in the 
utility of defining and improving the social order. And although Nietzsche 
would want that social order to be improved, at the same time he wants it to 
develop beyond the present, static state — developed only through the emergence 
of the ubermensch, the higher state of the human condition.
In the context of this dissertation, then, the revaluation of contemporary 
education rests with the reordering of priorities within the educational structure 
extant today. For this reason, I have chosen to use the term revaluation--
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admittedly a Nietzschean derivative-in offering the seven Corollaries for a 
Revaluation of Contemporary Education.
3.00 Corollaries for Contemporary Education 
In proposing and devising these Corollaries I have worked with the view 
that Nietzsche's philosophy of education never implied a specific pedagogy, but 
rather that it runs throughout the entire corpus of his work. While the 
explanations and examination of the Corollaries does not make any specific 
references to Nietzsche's works, it is important to remember that they are 
principles derived from his educational philosophy, that his teachings and 
reflections are immersed in them. His pedagogy is directed toward the 
development of the ubermensch, to which I have applied the term higher state of 
the human condition. The task of the being who has achieved the higher state of 
the human condition is to develop his creativity and his critical thinking skills to 
bring about the evolution of a revaluation of all values which will raise the level 
of the human condition. It is in this light that I have developed and presented 
these Corollaries. They are intended to make an offering of principles which are 
Nietzschean in spirit and in practice, and which, furthermore, present a viable 
consideration in our efforts to organize our educational system with the view 
toward enhancing critical thinking and creativity.
Part the Fourth offered a more succinct system, if we can call it such, for 
a Nietzschean pedagogy. Cooper's foci, Sharp's analysis of the three stages of the
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camel, the lion, and the child, and Murphy's metaphor of teaching the dance all 
point toward applications of an assumed pedagogy which can be called 
Nietzschean. Still, the challenge remains to offer an approach which is mete- 
educational in that it transcends the "mendaciousness", to use Nietzsche's 
vilification, of the mediocrity of the herd. It goes beyond that which is extant. 
All of these considerations have been present in the evolution of the Corollaries, 
and again, while they may not make specific reference to them, their presence 
should be understood to be implied and integral in each of the Corollaries.
Nevertheless, without intimating a defensive posture, I should like to quote 
Nietzsche in preliminary response to those who might otherwise find these 
Corollaries pedantic and imperious. In his preface to The Antichrist, Nietzsche 
identifies those to whom and for whom that work was written. They are a select 
group who embody the essence of the being in the higher state of the human 
condition.
Well then! Such men alone are my readers, my right readers, my 
predestined readers: what matter the rest? The rest-that is merely 
mankind. One must be above mankind in strength, in loftiness of soul-- in 
contempt.13
I feel a certain identity with this quotation, for the Corollaries are, indeed, intended 
for a select group of those who would understand them in the first place, and 
who would have the courage to implement them in the second place.
Again, however, it is important to emphasize that these Corollaries are 
philosophical in nature, and mete-educational in their discipline and application. 
They are not intended to propose a lexicon of directive methods, but rather, are
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to be the formation of a framework which takes into account an appeal to a 
higher ideal for the human condition-the higher state of being within each 
individual who dares to engage such a task. Thus it is now that we take the 
excursion into the Corollaries for a Revaluation of Contemporary Education.
Corollary 1: While the learner is to be the focus of education, the object of education is
a quest of taking the learner beyond the confines of collective and 
individual mediocrity.
The comprehensive nature of education must include a more expansive 
view of its obligations to the development of that individual who would have the 
strength and courage to use his creativity and critical thinking in concerted efforts 
to redirect values in the human condition. As such, it cannot ignore the learner 
as the focus of all its activities. This is in opposition to contemporary education 
which has taken the Deweyan conception of the socializing aspect of education 
and has used it in an effort to create a class of "equals"~the mediocrity of the 
herd, as Nietzsche would see it.
The basic question, then, has to do with the fundamental aims of 
education. Is it to develop free-thinking, creative beings who can use their 
education to improve the human condition, or is it to be the vehicle by which the 
state promotes and perpetuates a false sense of security by making certain that 
no one is more privileged than another? One is reminded of Kurt Vonnegut's 
short story, "Harrison Bergeron." In that -iythical futuristic society, those who 
were talented were forced to wear garish implements which would limit their
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physical and mental capabilities. Any hint of purported superiority would be 
dealt with swiftly and severely by "Diana Moon Glampers," the "Handicapper 
General." In such a world, the individual was a threat to the artificial balance of 
the society, and his talents were clearly not the focus of educational efforts.
The development of the talents of the individual would not promote the status 
quo. Thus, the focus was on the promotion of the social structure.
In a Nietzschean pedagogy, the learner is the focus; but this is not to imply 
that education is to be a "student-centered" enterprise. Such an approach denies 
the essence of knowledge which reaches beyond the individual to the realms of 
historical developments of epistemological discovery in the human condition. 
That higher state of the human condition is predicated upon the accumulation of 
knowledge precedent to the present learner, and could not be reached without the 
existence of such a history of knowledge. It is reached by the learner who 
recognizes that he is within the continuum of higher developments of which he 
is a consequent, but at the same time, to which he is obliged to augment and to 
enhance. While not at the center of education, the learner is the direct beneficiary 
of educational enterprises and is, therefore, its focus. His inheritance is the 
opportunity to add to this continuum of knowledge through the development of 
his own creativity and critical thinking. When the learner realizes this, he can 
begin to reach beyond the traditional values in an effort to redirect, to redefine, 
to revaluate them for the enhancement of the human condition.
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Corollary 2: The educator is a guide for the attainment of the higher state of being in 
the learner.
The Nietzschean pedagogist m ust have reached the higher state of the 
hum an condition prior to being an effective pedagogist in any sense. In this 
sense, the Deweyan observation that "those who cannot do, must teach" is clearly 
contradicted. Since the goal of education is to propel the learner to the higher state 
of the hum an condition pedagogy is, in fact, a doing activity. No guide can lead 
the way without having been there prior to guiding. My brother, Dr. Frank 
Ogden, is a highly acclaimed fly fisherman who has fished in the Ten Thousand 
Islands in the Florida Everglades for many years. At the same time, he has 
trained many fledgling fishermen to become guides. It was his initial explorations 
of that beautiful mangrove forest by himself, however, which created his expertise 
-h e  has been there. His discovery in this pursuit is not unlike that of the 
Nietzschean pedagogist in that it was self-discovery. This is analogous to that of 
the educator as a guide. It is in this context, then, that the educator is a guide. 
His self-discovery has been an exercise in self-overcoming, thus, he can anticipate 
those moments in the learners experience which are critical in the quest for self­
overcoming.
In the process of being such a guide, the educator liberates the learner from 
his own apprehensions and fears, assists him in overcoming the self-conceived 
notions of inadequacy, and, finally, sees the learner as a colleague, a fellow 
revolutionary in the revaluation of the human condition. The educator recognizes 
that while the task of being a liberating guide is consistent, his approaches to each
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learner must take into account the individual uniqueness each possesses. He may 
even be a taunter to the learner, but always he is conscious of the constructive 
nature of the pedagogical process.
One is reminded of a song made famous by the British blues singer, Joe 
Cocker, "You Can Leave Your Hat On." That song seductively entices his female 
companion to disrobe, even offering specific instruction in this venture. When 
there is nothing left to remove, she is told, "You can leave your hat on." The hat, 
in the final analysis, is the symbol of her pride, so that while she exposes the 
beauty of her form, thus becoming quite vulnerable, it is clear that her dignity, 
her pride, will not be removed. In the same fashion, the educator must disrobe 
the learner's layers of misconceived or ill-founded notions in an effort to reveal 
to the learner the beauty of his own being; but just as the hat stays on Joe 
Cocker's disrobing image, so the pride must stay with the learner. The act of 
intellectually disrobing, in this instance, leaves the learner vulnerable, but the 
pedagogist is there to make certain that it becomes a constructive exercise in the 
quest of self-overcoming-of moving on to the higher state of the human condition. 
Thus, while it is the task of the pedagogist to make the learner vulnerable, the 
individual pride of the learner must remain intact. The pedagogist, as guide, 
m ust expose the learner to his own weaknesses, his own vulnerability, in order 
to bring about self-overcoming, and on to the higher state of the human condition.
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Corollary 3: Education is analogous to a Rorschach Ink Blot interpretation.
Nietzsche's perspectival epistemology lays the foundation for an 
educational experience which is subject to the interpretations of the learner, and 
this provides the basis for the analogy between education and the Rorschach Ink 
Blot interpretation. While the validity of the Rorschach interpretations may still 
be a subject for debate within the psychological community, its existence serves 
as an example of how education must be approached. Just as the interpretation 
of what the ink blot represents is solely within the realm of the observer, so 
education is subject to its interpretation by the learner. This is not meant to 
imply that education has no meaning outside that interpretation, but rather, that 
the experiences of education are totally within the cognitive construction of the 
learner.
As a consequence, different learners may apprehend the Pythagorean 
Theorem, for example, but their applications of it will be dependent upon their 
perspectival interpretations of its utility. The engineer will use it for solving 
problems in land surveys; the poet will use it as metaphor for a given symmetry 
in nature; and the philosopher will use it as an example of cognitive reasoning 
within the human condition. Just as the ink blot is there, so the Pythagorean 
Theorem is there, but the interpretation of its significance is subject to each of the 
learners' perspectives.
The import for the pedagogist here is that it is incumbent upon him to 
understand and to approach his entire enterprise with the view that while he may
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be presenting meaningful material, the learner will apply it in a fashion which is 
commensurate with his own interpretation of it. To insure that this interpretation 
is consistent with what the pedagogist realizes will be of crucial significance to 
the learner, the pedagogist must approach it in a manner which allows the learner 
to achieve a self-realization of it. The ink blot is there, that cannot be denied, and 
the learner must see this. It is significant that it is there; but what is more, is that 
the pedagogist must allow the learner to see more in it—to see his own creativity 
and critical analysis in the ink blot. This is the analogous nature between 
education and the ink blot: both are existentially present, yet both are subject to 
the interpretations of the perceivers. Such an acknowledgement by the 
pedagogist opens the door to a more meaningful approach to the entire 
educational process.
Corollary 4: Learning is an internal process; teaching is an external process.
This corollary is a logical extension of Corollary 3 and is presented more as 
an emphasis of the perspectival nature of learning, and hence, of education. This 
corollary obviously may not rank with the most profound of observations in the 
world of education, but it serves a most utilitarian purpose. That purpose is to 
remind us of the nature of pedagogy and its relationship to learning. The validity 
which the pedagogist gains in his pursuits is dependent upon his having arrived 
at the higher level of the human condition prior to his becoming a pedagogist. He 
can empathize and sympathize with the learner, and thus, his approaches have
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more meaning for the learner. While he cannot allow the learner to achieve self- 
discovery, self-realization, self-overcoming in the same manner which he achieved 
it, the pedagogist can show the learner how he did it. The great task, then, is to 
help the learner find his own way—the discovery of his own creativity, the 
development of his own critical analysis.
I am reminded of the late Professor Roland Holroyd of LaSalle University 
who said that the task of the educator is to "salt" the horse so that when he is led 
to the water he will "want" to drink. Understanding the nature of the relationship 
between teaching and learning, and between the educator and the learner is 
pivotal for the success of education, and for the achievement of the pedagogist.
Corollary 5: Values are inherently interwoven into the fabric of education, but are
socially motivated and, as such, are trapped.
The recognition that values are captives of the society from which and for 
which they emerge is fundamental in understanding the function of education. 
The recurring question of education being a beacon for or a mirror of the society 
which it serves gains impact here. If education is merely the cradle of 
socialization, then it is merely a mirror of society. If, on the other hand, it is to 
be the beacon, the guiding light, of the society then it must constantly agitate that 
society. This is just what Nietzsche had in mind. Values are extant only for the 
purposes of socialization. Even the Ten Commandments provide for a compatible 
social order. The task of education being the development of beings in the higher 
state of the hum an condition presents an obvious contradiction for the pedagogist.
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While education m ust serve its society, it must still reach for the highest possible 
level of achievement within its constituents. It m ust constantly challenge those 
precepts which have become, for lack of a better word, "tradition." Now, perhaps 
tradition gives a society a definition of itself, but it is, at the same time, 
antithetical to the purposes of education. Witness the monumental destruction 
attendant with societies which have fiercely and blindly clung to tradition, for the 
sake of tradition, especially when those traditions have been fundamentally 
antagonistic toward higher values.
We know that what is popular is not always right, and what is right is not 
always popular. Education, in the form of the pedagogist, must be diligent in its 
efforts to bring out that level of creativity and critical thinking in its learners 
which will promote higher values—the higher state of the human condition. The 
tension which exists between the proper goal of education and the promotion of 
the society, as the state, is one which m ust weigh in favor of educational pursuits 
even to the destruction of antiquated values and mores. Change is the 
fundamental constant in the human condition, a fact to which both Nietzsche and 
Heraclitus have paid great respect. This corollary is intended to heighten that 
tension so that pedagogist realize its impact upon education. When the values 
of a society become destructive of the ends of achieving the higher state of the 
human condition they must be revaluated, and perhaps, even rejected. This 
revaluation will be the task of the pedagogist in dealing with the learner. And as 
a consequence, it is vital that the pedagogist fully understand the genesis of
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societal value structures.
Corollary 6: The structure of education must serve the development of the learner, not
the preservation of the state. It must provide for a curriculum which 
fosters the development of creativity and critical thinking.
Concomitant with Corollary 5, this corollary emphasizes the necessity of 
having an educational system which promotes the learner with creativity and 
critical thinking. There is nothing so dangerous to those in power as an 
individual who thinks clearly for himself beyond the confines of the state. This 
is not to say that the state must not or should not promote education, but that the 
ends of that promotion m ust result in the development of the higher state of the 
hum an condition. It is education as an institution which must keep in mind that 
it is the development of the learner which preserves it, and not the preservation 
of the state which promotes it. The real danger is that strong state control of 
education brings with it the tragic consequence that education becomes a tool of 
those in political power at any given time. Often, this means that censorship and 
propaganda become the ends of education, and creativity and critical thinking 
become the casualties. Thus, education must be independent from the state in 
terms of its ends and implementation, for without this independence, education 
can never develop the higher state of being in the individual learner.
Corollary 7: Elitism does not imply privilege; it demands service.
That a Nietzschean pedagogy produces a kind of elitism is a given. The 
consideration, then, is the ends to which that elitism is directed. Traditionally,
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elitism smacks of the implications of privilege, of a class of beings who by virtue 
of their mere existence not only claim entitlement to but also expect exception and 
privilege. However, this is not that case with beings who have evolved to the 
higher state of the human condition. Nietzsche repeatedly speaks of the hardships 
entailed in pursuing the higher state of being, of the sacrifices necessary with self­
overcoming, of the demands of such an ascetic life. This is not consistent with 
the traditional views of elitism. The application of an "imposed burden," 
presented in Part the Fourth, Section 2.00, analogous to the "chosen" status of the 
Hebrew nation serves as an example here. It is the application of service, not of 
privilege, to which this elitist class is subject. That service is the obligation to 
evolve beings to the higher state of the human condition-to the privilege of using 
their creativity and their powers of critical thinking in the development of an 
enhanced human condition. It is the obligation of education, and hence, of the 
pedagogist, to bring the human condition to this higher state, such that what now 
appears "elitist" will become, hopefully and ultimately, the norm.
4.00 Commentary on the Corollaries 
The Corollaries for a Revaluation of Contemporary Education evolved with the 
intention of providing a referential framework for a pedagogy which is uniquely 
and distinctly Nietzschean. Their application into a specific methodology is left 
for others to venture. As such, the offering of a succinct curriculum 
encompassing specific courses, let us say, in language, history, science,
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mathematics, physical education, music, dance, art, and the like, would limit and 
inhibit the scope and intention of this inquiry. Thus, I have not sought to do so. 
This exercise is meant to offer a beacon for pedagogists and education authorities 
in an effort to move away from the stagnation which has plagued American 
education for the past half-century—away from a philosophy which has sacrificed 
creativity and critical thinking in favor of some egalitarian utopia which has 
produced an entire apologetic litany for a welfare state, for the preservation of 
mediocrity, for a system which is exhausted from the weight of its own excess of 
liberalism in the futile quest for a definition of equality. If these Corollaries can 
awaken the intellectual soul of contemporary education, we may begin to realize 
the benefits of an education which will legitimately bring our learners to the 
higher state of the human condition.
Nevertheless, an acceptable point of departure in structuring any kind of 
curriculum implied by the Corollaries based upon a Nietzschean pedagogy would 
be with the training of those who would be pedagogists. A broad-based 
preparation for them would have to include more philosophical studies, more 
psychology, more exercises in personal creativity, more understanding of 
universal principles provided in studying the classics, and more critical analysis 
of history. From that base, less administrative intrusion into the classroom would 
have to ensue, so that these pedagogists could be free to allow the creativity of 
the learner to surface. These steps would provide an excellent foundation for 
devising a system which develops the higher state of the human condition in every
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learner, regardless of the discipline being pursued. It was with this in mind that 
the entire inquiry here was begun, and it is the hope that their structure will offer 
a rudimentary framework from which we can launch a knowledge delivery 
system as education based upon Nietzschean pedagogy.
5.00 Concluding Comment 
As a concluding note, it has been the quest of this dissertation to bring into 
a single volume the various interpretations of Nietzsche's philosophy of 
education, and to evolve a meta-educational pedagogy based upon these 
observations and interpretations. To that end, I believe it has been satisfactory. 
W hat is left yet to do elsewhere is to develop a more concise definition and 
representation of a Nietzschean pedagogist—perhaps an ubermensch as pedagogist. 
What is certain, nevertheless, is that change will prompt and demand his advent 
in the human condition.
The ubermensch as pedagogist: such a one would feel too much of the cosmos, and thus, 
be its citizen; see too far into its depths, and thus, be its philosopher; so that his Soul 
would quake, his Spirit heighten as he realizes the immensity of his own Being — and 
from that moment on bear the burden.
-A G O
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